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ABSTRACT
With the current explosion in the speed and volume of data, the conventional computation
systems are not capable of dealing with large data efficiently. In this project, we do research
in the data stream sampling methods and an application on insider threat detection.
The goal of random sampling is to select a subset from the original population so that the
subset can represent the whole population. In many real world applications, by sampling a
subset from the original population, we can estimate the global statistical properties, such as
mean, variance, probability distribution, etc. The goal of random sampling from a distributed
stream is to select a subset from the union of the streams such that each element in the
distributed stream is sampled with equal probability.
In some cases, the “Heavy Hitters” dominate the random sample. The heavy hitters are the
elements with high frequency. The distinct random sample can be applied so that the elements
with low frequency can also be seen. Distinct sampling from a distributed stream is proposed
to extract a subset from the unique set of the union of the distributed stream. In database
query optimization, sampling unique subset from the population is an important task. Random
sampling and distinct sampling are among the fundamental techniques and algorithms for large
scale data analysis and the query enhancement over database systems. We propose algorithms,
theoretical analysis, and experimental evaluations on random sampling and distinct sampling
from a distributed stream.
Nowadays, with more and more attacks on the computer systems, it is important to know
how we protect our computer systems or classified information from hackers or attackers.
Among all the attack or data breaches, more and more cases come from inside of an organiza-
tion. It is called “Insider Threat.” In recent reports, malicious insiders are causing enormous
damages in organizations. We propose two insider threat detection framework that monitors
the system logs and detect anomaly behaviors. We propose a Scenario-based Insider Threat
xiii
Detection method and a Session-based Insider Threat Detection. We implement our framework
in Java, and present experimental evaluation on a synthetic dataset.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
With the current explosion in the speed and volume of data, the term “Big Data” has
become popular in the computer science community. According to Internet Live Stats1, Twitter
has more than 332 million active users per day, with more than 474 million tweets every
day. Google receives more than 2.4 billion search requests daily. More than 1.4 EB data is
transmitted each day. These data, which arrive in real-time fashion, are called the “Data
Stream.” The term “Data Stream” refers to a continuous, possibly time-varying, sequence of
data records, in the form of events, messages, tuples, etc. Some applications require to monitor
data stream and evaluate important statistical properties from data stream. If Amazon want
to know the best selling merchandise in the previous hour, one of the methods is to store the
distinct set of elements and their counts in a hash map. But if we want to find the most popular
merchandise in the 24-hour window, we need to store billions of entries in the memory. It is
not memory and computation efficient. We need a data stream computation algorithm, which
is memory and computation efficient, and possibly one-pass.
1.1 Data Stream Sampling
In many cases, data streams are dispersed among different areas of the world. For example,
Google has data centers places such as Council Bluffs, USA, Douglas County, USA, Changhua
County, Taiwan. The coordinator is responsible for answering the query about the union of
the distributed streams. One way is to send to the coordinator whatever the sites observe.
However, the transmitted data in local data streams can be large. The network bandwidth
is a valuable and limited resource. It is impractical to collect all the data in one site and to
1http://www.internetlivestats.com/
2Figure 1.1: Distributed network model with k sites and a coordinator
compute them in a centralized manner. A new computation model is required under distributed
network.
Cormode et al. (2008) has proposed the distributed, continuous streaming model. Figure 1.1
shows the architecture of our distributed model with k sites. Each site receives a large volume
of data from the local stream, Si. The coordinator responds to queries over the union of local
streams, S = ∪ki=1Si. The main problems in the distributed model are how to answer accurately
at the coordinator at all times and how to minimize the communication cost between sites and
the coordinator.
In the distributed computation system, the distributed sites usually send out the summary
of necessary information to the coordinator. One of the summary techniques is to sample a
subset from the population. Random sampling is a fundamental problem to provide a smaller
subset from the population, where the subset is able to present the attributes in the population.
Sampling is also one of the tool to provide stream summary, approximate database and search
3query, selectivity estimation, and query planning. To generate a random sample over data
streams, one of the problems is the size of streams. The data observed from data stream is
enormously large; Facebook, for example, has 510 comments, 293 thousands status updates,
and 136 thousands photo uploads every 60 seconds. One of the solutions is to apply distributed
network model so that we can divide the load among the data centers. A requirement of
distributed random sampling over a distributed stream is raised. An application of distributed
data stream is on network routers. Maintaining a random sample from the union of data streams
is important to detect the global properties Huang et al. (2007). Estimating the number of
distinct elements Cormode and Garofalakis (2005); Cormode et al. (2008) and heavy hitters
Babcock and Olston (2003); Keralapura et al. (2006); Manjhi et al. (2005); Yi and Zhang (2009)
are also popular problems on distributed data streams.
An alternative aggregation method is distinct random sampling. A distinct random sample
is a subset chosen from the set of unique elements in data. The probability of an element to
be sampled is independent from its frequency, as long as it is observed so far. It is useful to
answer the number of distinct elements or the summary of distinct elements. For example, in
network monitoring, we are interested in the number of distinct IPs visiting a specific website.
Recall the simple random sampling, where the probability of an element to be sampled
is proportional to its frequency. Heavy hitters, those elements with high frequency in data,
are favorable for simple random sampling. The higher frequency an element is observed, the
more likely the element is to be sampled in simple random sampling. With highly skewed
data distribution, a few elements dominate the sample whereas elements with low frequency
are ignored. In contrast, a distinct random sample is independent from the element frequency.
Low-frequency elements are equally likely to be included in distinct random sample.
Due to this property, distinct random sampling has been found in several applications in
database query processing Gibbons (2001), network monitoring Tirthapura et al. (2006), and
in detecting anomalous network traffic Venkataraman et al. (2005); a simple random sampling
method is not suitable for these applications. Another application of distinct random sampling
is query optimizers in commercial relational database systems. Query optimizers enhance the
4choice of query processing strategy by maintaining a d distinct sample of individual database
columns Poddar ().
1.2 Insider Threat Detection
For organizations and companies, information security is always a practice to protect their
assets from being compromised by outside forces. Along with the growth and the advance
in computer technology, cyber security and communication security are gaining importance.
Hackers steal information from organizations and companies, causing physical and virtual dam-
ages. In 2013, Target faced a hackeing incident, causing loss of credit and debit card records of
more than 40 million customers, as well as personal information of 70 million people. Target
had to pay 10 million dollars to settle the lawsuit. The loss of Target is not only the cost of
lawsuit but also the loss of customers and their confidence. This confidentiality of information
is well-known, and many researches has been immersed to the issue.
However, another type of attack is emerging. Insiders, who have permission to access the
computer systems within a domain of normal behavior to accomplish their work efficiently,
perform malicious activities, including stealth, damage, and modification of secret information.
Most of the security defense systems are designed to defend attacks from outside, not inside.
The attack from insiders is hard to detect. According to a speech in RSA Conference Richards
(2013) based on the survey over 10 years period, “The average cost per incident is $412,000,
and the average loss per industry is $15 million over ten years. In several instances, damages
reached more than $1 billion.” The cost of insider attack can be so large; the attack of insider is
hard to detect. There are some case studies. In comparison with intruders, insiders have more
sophisticated knowledge about the computation systems and data structure. Gunasekhar, Rao,
and Basu study the definition of different type of insiders, discover the difficulties in detection,
and propose ways to prevent. In their study, the types of insiders can be (1) Pure insiders,
(2) Insider Associates, (3) Insider affiliates, and (4) Outside affiliates. The pure insiders are
the employees. The insider associates are the other employees who have physical access to the
computers, such as security guards, and janitors.
5The insider affiliates are the friends or spouses of employees, who have chances to access
to the computer when visiting. Outside affiliates can access into the network via unprotected
wireless network. Research on insider threat have several categories: the philosophy of malicious
insiders, the behavior patterns and motivations of malicious insiders, and the detection of
malicious insiders. Randazzo et al. (2005) proposed six findings on their analysis on 80 cases.
• The executions by criminals are “low and slow.” In average, the time elapse almost 32
months to be detected by the victim organization.
• The means of insiders were not very sophisticated. The role they served are seldom
technical, or their fraud behaviors are not explicitly technical.
• The frauds by manager are different from the ones by non-manager in their damage and
duration.
• Most cases don’t involved with collusion.
• An audit, customer complaints, or coworker suspicion are the three common detection
ways of insider incidents.
• The target of committing fraud is on personal identifiable information (PII).
In this project, we work on different approaches toward the discovery of malicious insiders.
We propose a Session-based Insider Threat Detection and a Scenario-based Insider Threat
Detection. The session-based insider threat detection provides a high-level view on users’
behavior pattern. We segment the system logs of a user into a smaller chunk, called Session.
By comparing the current session with the history sessions, we can deviate anomaly session
from the normal sessions. The scenario-based insider threat detection starts from knowing
insider’s attack scenarios. Malicious insiders have their intention, either stealing classified
information from the organization or causing damage to organizations reputation. An attack
scenario describes how the malicious insider achieve their intention. By understanding their
attack scenarios, we can detect if the behavioral sequence of a user matches any attack scenario.
An experimental evaluation is presented to compare the performance of the two approaches.
6CHAPTER 2. CONTRIBUTION
2.1 Random Sampling from a Distributed Stream
Our main contributions are a simple algorithm for sampling without replacement from a
distributed stream, as well as a matching lower bound showing that the message complexity
of our algorithm is optimal. The message complexity is the number of message transmission
between sites and the coordinator. The algorithm is easy to implement, and as our experiments
show, has very good practical performance.
Algorithm: We present an algorithm that uses an expected O
(
k log(n/s)
log(1+(k/s))
)
number of mes-
sages for continuously maintaining a random sample of size s from k distributed data streams
of total size n. Note that if s < k/8, this number is O
(
k log(n/s)
log(k/s)
)
, while if s ≥ k/8, this number
is O(s log(n/s)). The memory requirement at the coordinator is s words. The remote sites
in our scheme store a single machine word and use constant time per stream update, both of
which are clearly optimal.
Lower Bound: We also show that any correct protocol which succeeds with constant proba-
bility must send Ω
(
k log(n/s)
log(1+(k/s))
)
messages with constant probability. This also yields a bound
of Ω
(
k log(n/s)
log(1+(k/s))
)
on the expected message complexity of any correct protocol, showing that
the expected number of messages sent by our algorithm is optimal, up to constant factors.
Impact of Skew: The algorithm and lower bound as discussed do not assume any distribution
on the numbers of elements that arrive at the different sites. The worst case message complexity
arises in the setting where different sites receive nearly the same number of elements. In
a practical setting, however, it is common to have a skewed distribution of the arrivals at
different local streams. For example, traffic sensors posted on streets observing cars pass by
may see different volumes of activity depending on how busy the streets are. It is important
7to consider the performance in the skewed case when the different streams Si are of different
sizes.
To measure the performance of our algorithm in the presence of skew, we considered the
following model of data arrival. Suppose a set of probabilities pi, i = 1 . . . k, one per site, such
that
∑k
i=1 pi = 1. Each arrival into the system is sent to stream Si with a probability of
pi. The pis need not be equal, so that the numbers of elements seen by different sites can be
significantly different from each other.
We show that under such a model, our algorithm has a message complexity ofO
(
s log(n/s)
∑
i,pi 6=0
1
log( 2
pi
)
)
.
Note that the algorithm remains the same as in the worst case analysis, but the message com-
plexity is different, due to the assumed input model.
The message complexity under skew can be much smaller than the upper bound for general
case. For example, suppose there were only five sites receiving data, and the rest did not receive
any data. Further, suppose we want a sample of size 1. We have pi = 0.2 for i = 1 . . . 5, and
pi = 0, i > 5. In such a case the message complexity of our algorithm is only O(log n). In
contrast, the worst case upper bound for a sample size of 1 is O
(
k logn
log k
)
.
In another case, suppose that p1 = 1−c(k−1)/n, and pi = c/n for i ≥ 2, where c is a constant
independent of n. This models the case when one site receives a majority of elements, and each
of the other sites receives only about c elements. In such a case, the message complexity of our
algorithm is O(k + log n), to be contrasted with the general bound of O
(
k logn
log k
)
.
Experimental Evaluation: We conducted an experimental study evaluating the message
cost of our algorithm, comparing with the cost of the algorithm from Cormode et al. (2012).
We observe that the number of messages in our algorithm has a linear dependence on the
number of sites and sample size. In general, our algorithm achieves better performance than
the algorithm from Cormode et al. (2012). The benefit is especially clear when the required
sample size is high. In the presence of skew in data, our algorithm shows significantly improved
performance when compared with the case of no skew.
Sampling With Replacement: We also show how to modify our protocol to obtain a ran-
dom sample of size s chosen with replacement. The message complexity of this protocol is
O
((
k
log(2+(k/(s log s))) + s log s
)
log n
)
messages.
82.2 Distinct Random Sampling from a Distributed Stream
We make the following contributions. Let k denote the number of distributed sites, s the
desired sample size, and d the total number of distinct elements in the distributed stream.
• We present a distributed algorithm for continuously maintaining a distinct sample with-
out replacement from a distributed stream. The expected message complexity of the
algorithm is O
(
ks ln des
)
. When a query is posed at the central coordinator, it responds
with a distinct sample of size min{s, d} from the set of all elements seen so far in the
stream.
• We present a matching lower bound showing that any algorithm for continuously main-
taining a distinct sample without replacement from the distributed stream must have
a message complexity of Ω
(
ks ln des
)
. In other words, the message complexity of our
algorithm is optimal, to within a constant factor.
• We present an extension for continuously maintaining a distinct sample with replacement
from a distributed stream. We show that the message complexity of this algorithm is
bounded by O
(
ks ln des
)
, and that this is optimal to within a constant factor.
• We present an extension to sampling from a sliding window of the distributed stream. We
show this algorithm is also near-optimal in its message complexity through an appropriate
lower bound.
• We implemented our algorithm and evaluated its practical performance. We found that
our algorithms are easy to implement and provide a message complexity that is typically
much better than the worst case bounds that we derive.
Comparison with Simple Random Sampling
It is interesting to compare the message complexity of distributed distinct sampling (DDS) to
that of distributed simple random sampling (DRS). From previous work Cormode et al. (2012);
Tirthapura and Woodruff (2011), it is known that the message complexity of DRS for a sample
size s for n total elements distributed over k sites increases as approximately max{k, s} log(n/s)
91 In contrast, the message cost of DDS increases as k · s · log(d/s), where k is the number of
sites, d the total number of distinct elements, and s the sample size. The message complexity of
DDS is inherently larger than that of DRS if d (the number of distinct elements in the stream)
is comparable to n (the total number of elements in the stream).
To understand the reason for this difference, note that in DRS, when n elements have
already been received in the system, the probability of a new element being selected into the
sample decreases as s/n. In case of DDS, the probability of a new element being selected into
the sample decreases as s/d, where d is the number of distinct elements received by the system.
Due to the possibility of the same element appearing at different sites at a similar time, many
sites may be “fooled” into sending messages to the coordinator after simultaneously observing
the same element, and hence more messages may be communicated between the sites and the
coordinator in DDS. Our lower bound shows that this is not an artifact of an inferior algorithm
for DDS. Instead, greater coordination is inherently necessary for DDS than for DRS.
In our empirical experiment result, we observe that the message complexity of DDS is higher
than DRS when using flooding, round-robin, and random data distribution. Especially, when
using flooding distribution method, the DDS has message complexity 5 times higher than DRS
for 20 sites and a sample size of 50. When receiving the same element, the sites of DDS send
out messages if the element is to be sampled. The sites of DRS behave differently. Each site
samples the same element with probability of sn . It makes the difference between DRS and
DDS.
2.3 Insider Threat Detection from Log Streams
Our main contribution is developing a scenario-based anomaly detection framework. A
scenario is a sequence of events, describing how a malicious insider attacks an organization.
For example, Eric, a malicious insider, logs on at 9PM, searches for classified files, copies files
into an USB stick, and then logs off. We discover the anomaly events from the logs, and
1The exact expression is Θ
(
k log(n/s)
log(k/s)
)
if s < k/8 and Θ(s log(n/s)) if s ≥ k/8. This message complexity is
tight up to a constant factor, due to matching lower bounds.
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transform the anomaly event sequence into a string, L. Scenario, Si, is formatted as a general
expression. If there is a match between L and Si, we can report anomaly for the event sequence.
However, the anomaly events are nondeterministic. Logon hour, for example, is variant
among different users. It may be varied because of different working customs or work shifts.
A deterministic logon time range is not feasible for our application. A probability model is
applied to each user. We build up a probability model based on user’s history events, and
detect anomaly based on the model.
We implement our framework in Java, and evaluate its performance in real world. Our
framework detects the most events by malicious insiders from our reported events and from all
malicious insiders in the answer. We also detect the most malicious users from the dataset.
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CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 Random Sampling from a Distributed Stream
Obtaining a random sample from the union of distributed stream is required. Reservoir
Sampling Vitter (1985); Knuth (1981) algorithm (where this algorithm is attributed to Water-
man) is generalized to this problem. Our work generalizes the classic algorithm to the setting
of multiple distributed streams. We compare our algorithm with the algorithm proposed by
Cormode et al. (2012), short handed as CMYZ. The performance is evaluated by the message
complexity and memory consumption. The message complexity is the number of messages
between distributed sites, and the memory consumption is the coordinator and the number of
data elements stored in the sites and the coordinator respectively. The message complexity of
CMYZ is reported as O
[
k logk/s n+ s log n
]
, where k is the number of sites, s is the sample
size, and n is the number of elements observed so far. The comparison of our work and CMYZ
is shown in Table 3.1.
In additional to CMYZ, there are other researches in the continuous distributed streaming
model, including estimating frequency moments and counting the number of distinct elements
Cormode and Garofalakis (2005); Cormode et al. (2008), and estimating the entropy Arack-
aparambil et al. (2009). Stream sampling has a long history of research, starting from the
popular reservoir sampling algorithm, attributed to Waterman (see Algorithm R from Vitter
Table 3.1: Summary of Our Results for Message Complexity of Sampling Without Replacement
Upper Bound Lower Bound
Our Result CMYZ Cormode et al. (2012)
s < k8 O
(
k log(n/s)
log(k/s)
)
O
(
k logn
log(k/s)
)
Ω
(
k log(n/s)
log(k/s)
)
s ≥ k8 O (s log(n/s)) O (s log n) Ω (s log(n/s))
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(1985)) that has been known since the 1960s. Follow-up work includes speeding up reservoir
sampling Vitter (1985), weighted reservoir sampling Efraimidis and Spirakis (2006), sampling
over a sliding window and stream evolution Braverman et al. (2012); Xu et al. (2008); Babcock
et al. (2002); Gemulla and Lehner (2008); Aggarwal (2006a). Stream sampling has been used
extensively in large scale data mining applications, see for example Pavan et al. (2013); Dash
and Ng (2006); Malbasa and Vucetic (2007); Aggarwal (2006b). Stream sampling under sliding
windows has been considered in Braverman et al. (2009); Babcock et al. (2002). Deterministic
algorithms for finding the heavy-hitters in distributed streams, and corresponding lower bounds
for this problem were considered in Yi and Zhang (2009). Stream sampling under sliding win-
dows over distributed streams has been considered in Cormode et al. (2010a). Continuous
random sampling from the set of distinct elements in a stream has been considered in Chung
and Tirthapura (2015). The question of how to process a “sampled stream”,i.e. once a stream
has been sampled, is considered in McGregor et al. (2012).
A model of distributed streams related to ours was considered in Gibbons and Tirthapura
(2001, 2002, 2004). In this model, the coordinator was not required to continuously maintain an
estimate of the required aggregate, but when the query was posed to the coordinator, the sites
would be contacted and the query result would be constructed. In their model, the coordinator
could be said to be “reactive”, whereas in the model considered in this paper, the coordinator
is “pro-active”.
3.2 Distinct Random Sampling from a Distributed Stream
There is a growing literature on algorithms for continuous distributed monitoring, starting
from the basic “countdown problem” Cormode et al. (2008), frequency moments Woodruff
and Zhang (2012); Cormode et al. (2008), entropy Arackaparambil et al. (2009), heavy-hitters
and quantiles Yi and Zhang (2013), geometric methods for monitoring Sharfman et al. (2007);
Giatrakos et al. (2012), and often, matching lower bounds Woodruff and Zhang (2012). For a
recent survey on results in this model, see Cormode (2013). A survey of sampling on streams
appears in Lahiri and Tirthapura (2009).
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The closest prior work is the work on algorithms and lower bounds for distributed random
sampling Tirthapura and Woodruff (2011); Cormode et al. (2012). While the problems are
different, our algorithm for DDS on an infinite window is essentially an adaptation of the DRS
algorithm from Tirthapura and Woodruff (2011) with a few important differences: one is that
our algorithm uses sampling based on a randomly chosen hash function while the algorithm for
DRS samples based on independent random bits. Further, our algorithm employs additional
data structures to prevent duplicate messages from a site to the coordinator due to observing
the same element, this is not necessary for simple random sampling. The analysis of the message
complexity for the DRS and the DDS algorithms are different. The lower bound arguments
for the two problems (DRS and DDS) are also substantially different from each other. Our
analysis of the lower bound on message cost of any algorithm for DDS uses methods, that to
our knowledge, have not been applied to the continuous distributed streaming model.
3.3 Insider Threat Detection from Log Streams
The researches in insider threat are diverse among different fields. Psychologists research in
the detection of malicious insiders by behavior models Greitzer et al. (2012); Berk et al. (2012),
psychological profiling Axelrad et al. (2013). Shaw and Fischer (2005) propose the analysis and
overview of 10 types of trust betrayal. Based on their observations, they offer 8 cases applied to
insider threat. Schultz proposes a framework for predicting insider attacks by defining attack
related behavior and symptoms. Gates et al. (2014) propose their work on normal user profile
building, and information theft and leakage detection from file access logs. Duncan et al. (2012)
research in the applicability of current insider threat definitions and classifications in the cloud
environment.
Wave (), one of the insider threat mitigation software, focuses on specifically on data loss
prevention. Data encryption, automated remote backup, and document tagging are used to
prevent malicious insiders to deface, delete, or exfiltrate sensitive organization information.
Another approaches such as Raytheon’s SureView () apply compilation and analysis on multiple
sources of information on user behaviors. Other technologies, such as Palisade (), Prelert (), and
Securonix (), identify malicious behaviors from malicious insiders by characterizing network and
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user behaviors. Murphy et al. (2012); Berk et al. (2012) proposed BANDIT system, applying
10-step common-sense approach to limit the damage from malicious insiders.
As email becomes one of the common communication tools, the malicious usage of email
service gets severe. Several works have been devoted into the analysis and detection of malicious
usage of email, including spam or junk email detection. Machine learning techniques have been
applied to this era, e.g. Bayesian or Naive Bayessian classifier Sahami et al. (1998); Meyer and
Whateley (2004); Wang et al. (2015), decision tree Ghosh et al. (2012a), and kNN Harisinghaney
et al. (2014). The algorithms also apply to Short Message Service (SMS) Cormack et al. (2007);
Go´mez Hidalgo et al. (2006). As the social network services get popular, the misuse of social
networks is an issue. Several works Boykin and Roychowdhury (2005); Tan et al. (2013);
Ghosh et al. (2012b); Yardi et al. (2009) have been proposed to detect spam messages in social
network. All the works above review the content of the messages and detect the spams by the
word frequency features or TF-IDF.
Finite state machine is also applied in insider anomaly detections. Ho and Lee () proposed
a insider threat framework using FSM. They simulate insider threat situations by building
several experiments. Greitzer et al. (2008) propose an insider threat prediction framework from
employees’ psychosocial data, and with cybersecurity audit data. Ambre and Shekokar (2015)
build up a probabilistic approach and incorporate with log analysis and event correlation on
detecting anomaly insiders events. Upon receiving system logs, they first filter out unwanted
events based rules. A probability of an intrusion behavior given an event is calculated by
Bayessian theorem, and is used to determine if the given event is anomaly.
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PART I
DATA STREAM SAMPLING
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CHAPTER 4. DISTRIBUTED RANDOM SAMPLING ON A DATA
STREAM
4.1 Model
The coordinator node is assumed to be different from any of the sites. The coordinator
does not observe a local stream, but all queries for a random sample arrive at the coordinator.
It is straightforward to modify our algorithms for the case when the coordinator also observes
a local stream. Let S = ∪ni=1Si be the entire stream observed by the system, and note that
the total number of elements n = |S|. The sample size s supplied to the coordinator and
to the sites during initialization. The task of the coordinator is to continuously maintain a
random sample s of size min{n, s} consisting of elements chosen uniformly at random without
replacement from S.
We assume a synchronous communication model, where the system progresses in “rounds”.
In each round, each site can observe one element (or none), and send a message to the coor-
dinator, and receive a response from the coordinator. The coordinator may receive up to k
messages in a round, and respond to each of them in the same round. This model is essentially
identical to the model assumed in previous work Cormode et al. (2010a).
The sizes of the different local streams at the sites, their order of arrival, and the inter-
leaving of the streams at different sites, can all be arbitrary. The algorithm cannot make any
assumption about these. For instance, it is possible that a single site receives a large number of
elements before a different site receives its first element. It is also possible that all sites receive
elements streams that are of the same size and whose elements arrive in the same rounds. In
Section 4.5, we analyze the performance of the algorithm under certain specific input distri-
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butions. However, the algorithm still remains the same, and does not depend on the input
distribution.
Note that what matters for the algorithm is the global ordering of the stream items by their
time of arrival onto one of the sites. The “speed” of the stream, i.e., how long it takes for the
next item to arrive on a site does not play any role in the complexity of our algorithm, which
is concerned with the total number of messages transmitted.
4.2 Algorithm
Algorithm Intuition: The idea in the algorithm is as follows. Each site associates a random
weight with each element that it receives. The coordinator then maintains the set P of s
elements with the minimum weights in the union of the streams at all times, and this is a
random sample of S. This idea is similar to the spirit in all centralized reservoir sampling
algorithms. Reservoir sampling is a method for maintaining a random item from a stream of
items, while using memory that is small when compared with the size of the stream. Indeed,
one way to implement reservoir sampling is to assign a random weight to each stream item and
maintain the item with the minimum weight. In a distributed setting, the interesting aspect is
at what times do the sites communicate with the coordinator, and vice versa.
In our algorithm, the coordinator maintains u, which is the s-th smallest weight so far in
the system, as well as the sample P, consisting of all the elements that have weight no more
than u. Each site needs only maintain a single value ui, which is the site’s view of the s-th
smallest weight in the system so far. Note that it is too expensive to keep the view of each site
synchronized with the coordinator’s view at all times – to see this, note that the value of the
s-th smallest weight changes O(s log(n/s)) times, and updating every site each time the s-th
minimum changes takes a total of O(sk log(n/s)) messages.
In our algorithm, when site i sees an element with a weight smaller than ui, it sends it to
the central coordinator. The coordinator updates u and P, if needed, and then replies back to
i with the current value of u, which is the true minimum weight in the union of all streams.
Thus each time a site communicates with the coordinator, it makes a change to the random
sample, or, at least, gets to refresh its view of u.
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The algorithm at each site is described in Algorithms 1 and 2. The algorithm at the
coordinator is described in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 1: Initialization at Site i.
1 /* ui is site i’s view of the s-th smallest weight in the union of all
streams so far. Note this may ‘‘lag’’ the value stored at the
coordinator, in the sense that it may not agree with the s-th smallest
weight held by the coordinator. */
2 ui ← 1;
Algorithm 2: When Site i receives element e.
1 Let w(e) be randomly chosen weight between 0 and 1;
2 if w(e) < ui then
3 Send (e, w(e)) to the Coordinator;
4 Receive u′ from Coordinator;
5 Set ui ← u′;
Algorithm Correctness: Lemmas 1 and 2 establish the correctness of the algorithm.
Lemma 1. (1) If n ≤ s, then the set P at the coordinator contains all the (e, w) pairs seen at
all the sites so far. (2) If n > s, then P at the coordinator consists of the s (e, w) pairs such
that the weights of the pairs in P are the smallest weights in the stream so far.
Proof. The variable u is stored at the coordinator, and ui is stored at site i. First we note that
the variables u and ui are non-increasing with time; this can be verified from the algorithms.
Next, we note that for every i from 1 till k, at every round, ui ≥ u. This can be seen because
initially, ui = u = 1, and ui changes only in response to receiving u from the coordinator.
Thus, if fewer than s elements have appeared in the stream so far, u is 1, and hence ui is
also 1 for each site i. The next element observed in the system is also sent to the coordinator.
Thus, if n ≤ s, then the set P consists of all elements seen so far in the system.
Next, we consider the case n > s. Note that u maintains the s-th smallest weight seen at
the coordinator, and P consists of the s elements seen at the coordinator with the smallest
weights. We only have to show that if an element e, observed at site i is such that w(e) < u
then i must have sent (e, w(e)) to the coordinator. This follows because ui ≥ u at all times,
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Algorithm 3: Algorithm at Coordinator.
1 /* The random sample P consists of tuples (e, w) where e is an element,
and w the weight, such that the weights are the s smallest among all
the weights so far in the stream */
2 P ← ∅;
3 /* u is the value of the s-th smallest weight in the stream observed so
far. If there are less than s elements so far, then u is 1. */
4 u← 1;
5 while true do
6 if a message (ei, ui) arrives from site i then
7 if ui < u then
8 Insert (ei, ui) into P;
9 if |P| > s then
10 Discard the element (e, w) from P with the largest weight;
11 Update u to the current largest weight in P (which is also the s-th
smallest weight in the entire stream);
12 Send u to site i;
13 if a query for a random sample arrives then
14 return P
and if w(e) < u, then it must be true that w(e) < ui, and in this case, (e, w(e)) is sent to the
coordinator.
Lemma 2. At the end of each round, sample P at the coordinator consists of a uniform random
sample of size min{n, s} chosen without replacement from S.
Proof. In case n ≤ s, then from Lemma 1, we know that P contains every element of S. In
case n > s, from Lemma 1, it follows that P consists of s elements with the smallest weights
from S. Since the weights are assigned randomly, each element in S has a probability of sn of
belonging in P, showing that this is an uniform random sample. Since an element can appear
no more than once in the sample, this is a sample chosen without replacement.
4.3 Analysis of the Algorithm (Upper Bound)
We now analyze the message complexity of the maintenance of a random sample.
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For the sake of analysis, we divide the execution of the algorithm into “epochs”, where each
epoch consists of a sequence of rounds. The epochs are defined inductively. Let r > 1 be a
parameter, which will be fixed later. Recall that u is the s-th smallest weight so far in the
system (if there are fewer than s elements so far, u = 1). Epoch 0 is the set of all rounds from
the beginning of execution until (and including) the earliest round where u is 1r or smaller. Let
mj denote the value of u at the end of epoch j − 1. Epoch j consists of all rounds subsequent
to epoch (j − 1) until (and including) the earliest round when u is mjr or smaller. Note that
the algorithm does not need to be aware of the epochs, and this is only used for the analysis.
Suppose we call the original distributed algorithm described in Algorithms 3 and 2 as
Algorithm A. For the analysis, we consider a slightly different distributed algorithm, Algorithm
B, described below. Algorithm B is identical to Algorithm A except for the fact that at the
beginning of each epoch, the value u is broadcast by the coordinator to all sites.
While Algorithm A is natural, Algorithm B is easier to analyze. We first note that on the
same inputs, the value of u (and P) at the coordinator at any round in Algorithm B is identical
to the value of u (and P) at the coordinator in Algorithm A at the same round. Hence, the
partitioning of rounds into epochs is the same for both algorithms, for a given input. The
correctness of Algorithm B follows from the correctness of Algorithm A. The only difference
between them is in the total number of messages sent. In B we have the property that for
all i from 1 to k, ui = u at the beginning of each epoch (though this is not necessarily true
throughout the epoch), and for this, B has to pay a cost of at least k messages in each epoch.
Lemma 3. The number of messages sent by Algorithm A for a set of input streams Si, i = 1 . . . k
is never more than twice the number of messages sent by Algorithm B for the same input.
Proof. Consider site v in a particular epoch j. In Algorithm B, v receives mj at the beginning
of the epoch through a message from the coordinator. In Algorithm A, v may not know mj at
the beginning of epoch j. We consider two cases.
Case I: v sends a message to the coordinator in epoch j in Algorithm A. In this case, the
first time v sends a message to the coordinator in this epoch, v will receive the current value
of u, which is smaller than or equal to mj . This communication costs two messages, one in
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each direction. Henceforth, in this epoch, the number of messages sent in Algorithm A is no
more than those sent in B. In this epoch, the number of messages transmitted to/from v in A
is at most twice the number of messages as in B, which has at least one transmission from the
coordinator to site v.
Case II: v did not send a message to the coordinator in this epoch, in Algorithm A. In this
case, the number of messages sent in this epoch to/from site v in Algorithm A is smaller than
in Algorithm B.
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Let ξ denote the total number of epochs.
Lemma 4. If r ≥ 2,
E [ξ] ≤
(
log(n/s)
log r
)
+ 2
Proof. Let z =
(
log(n/s)
log r
)
. First, we note that in each epoch, u decreases by a factor of at least
r. Thus after (z + `) epochs, u is no more than 1
rz+`
= ( sn)
1
r`
. Thus, we have
Pr[ξ ≥ z + `] ≤ Pr
[
u ≤
( s
n
) 1
r`
]
Let Y denote the number of elements (out of n) that have been assigned a weight of s
nr`
or
lesser. Y is a binomial random variable with expectation s
r`
. Note that if u ≤ s
nr`
, it must be
true that Y ≥ s.
Pr[ξ ≥ z + `] ≤ Pr[Y ≥ s] ≤ Pr[Y ≥ r`E [Y ]] ≤ 1
r`
where we have used Markov’s inequality.
Since ξ takes only positive integral values,
E [ξ] =
∑
i>0
Pr[ξ ≥ i] =
z∑
i=1
Pr[ξ ≥ i] +
∑
`≥1
Pr[ξ ≥ z + `]
≤ z +
∑
`≥1
1
r`
≤ z + 1
1− 1/r ≤ z + 2
where we have assumed r ≥ 2.
Let nj denote the total number of elements that arrived in epoch j. We have n =
∑ξ−1
j=0 nj .
Let µ denote the total number of messages sent during the entire execution. Let µj denote
the total number of messages sent in epoch j and Xj the total number of messages sent from
the sites to the coordinator in epoch j. µj is the sum of two parts, (1) k messages sent by the
coordinator at the start of the epoch, and (2) twice the number of messages sent from the sites
to the coordinator.
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µj = k + 2Xj (4.1)
µ =
ξ−1∑
j=0
µj = ξk + 2
ξ−1∑
j=0
Xj (4.2)
For each κ = 1 . . . nj in epoch j, we define a 0-1 random variable Yκ as follows. Yκ = 1 if
observing the κ-th element in the epoch resulted in a message being sent to the coordinator,
and Yκ = 0 otherwise.
Xj =
nj∑
κ=1
Yκ (4.3)
Let F (η, α) denote the event nj = η and mj = α. The following Lemma gives a bound on
a conditional probability that is used later.
Lemma 5. For each κ = 1 . . . nj − 1
Pr[Yκ = 1|F (η, α)] ≤ α− α/r
1− α/r
Proof. Suppose that the j-th element in the epoch was observed by site v. For this element to
cause a message to be sent to the coordinator, the random weight assigned to it must be less
than uv at that instant. Conditioned on mj = α, uv is no more than α.
Note that in this lemma we exclude the last element that arrived in epoch j, thus the weight
assigned to element j must be greater than α/r. Thus, the weight assigned to j must be a
uniform random number in the range (α/r, 1). The probability this weight is less than the
current value of uv is no more than
α−α/r
1−α/r , since uv ≤ α.
Lemma 6. For each epoch j
E [Xj ] ≤ 1 + 2rs
Proof. We first obtain the expectation conditioned on F (η, α), and then remove the condition-
ing. From Lemma 5 and Equation 4.3 we get:
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E [Xj |F (η, α)] ≤ 1 + E
[
(
η−1∑
κ=1
Yκ)|F (η, α)
]
≤ 1 +
η−1∑
κ=1
E [Yκ|F (η, α)]
≤ 1 + (η − 1)α− α/r
1− α/r .
Using r ≥ 2 and α ≤ 1, we get: E [Xj |F (η, α)] ≤ 1 + 2(η − 1)α.
We next consider the conditional expectation E [Xj |mj = α].
E [Xj |mj = α]
=
∑
η
Pr[nj = η|mj = α]E [Xj |nj = η,mj = α]
≤
∑
η
Pr[nj = η|mj = α](1 + 2(η − 1)α)
≤ E [1 + 2(nj − 1)α|mj = α]
≤ 1 + 2α(E [nj |mj = α]− 1)
Using Lemma 7, we get
E [Xj |mj = α] ≤ 1 + 2α
(rs
α
− 1
)
≤ 1 + 2rs
Since E [Xj ] = E [E [Xj |mj = α]], we have E [Xj ] ≤ E [1 + 2rs] = 1 + 2rs.
Lemma 7.
E [nj |mj = α] = rs
α
Proof. Recall that nj , the total number of elements in epoch j, is the number of elements
observed till the s-th minimum in the stream decreases to a value that is less than or equal to
α/r.
Let Z denote a random variable that equals the number of elements to be observed from
the start of epoch j till s new elements are seen, each of whose weight is less than or equal
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to α/r. Clearly, conditioned on mj = α, it must be true that nj ≤ Z. For δ = 1 to s, let
Zδ denote the number of elements observed from the state when (δ − 1) elements have been
observed with weights that are less than α/r till the state when δ elements have been observed
with weights less than α/r. Zδ is a geometric random variable with parameter α/r.
We have Z =
∑s
δ=1 Zδ and E [Z] =
∑s
δ=1 E [Zδ] =
sr
α . Since E [nj |mj = α] ≤ E [Z], the
lemma follows.
Lemma 8.
E [µ] ≤ (k + 4rs+ 2)
(
log(n/s)
log r
+ 2
)
Proof. Using Lemma 6 and Equation 4.1, we get the expected number of messages in epoch j:
E [µj ] ≤ k + 2(2rs+ 1) = k + 2 + 4rs
Note that the above is independent of j. The proof follows from Lemma 4, which gives an
upper bound on the expected number of epochs.
Theorem 1. The expected message complexity E [µ] of our algorithm is as follows.
I: If s ≥ k8 , then E[µ] = O
(
s log
(
n
s
))
II: If s < k8 , then E[µ] = O
(
k log(ns )
log( ks )
)
Proof. We note that the upper bounds on E[µ] in Lemma 8 hold for any value of r ≥ 2.
Case I: s ≥ k8 . In this case, we set r = 2. From Lemma 8,
E [µ] ≤ (8s+ 8s+ 2)
(
log(n/s)
log 2
)
= (16s+ 2) log
(n
s
)
= O
(
s log
(n
s
))
Case II: s < k8 . We minimize the expression in the statement of Lemma 8 by setting r =
k
4s ,
and get: E [µ] = O
(
k log(ns )
log( ks )
)
.
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4.4 Lower Bound
Theorem 2. For a constant q, 0 < q < 1, any correct protocol must send Ω
(
k log(n/s)
log(1+(k/s))
)
messages with probability at least 1−q, where the probability is taken over the protocol’s internal
randomness.
Proof. Let β = (1 + (k/s)). Define ξ = Θ
(
log(n/s)
log(1+(k/s))
)
epochs as follows: in the j-th epoch,
j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , ξ− 1}, there are βj−1k global stream updates, which can be distributed among
the k servers in an arbitrary way.
We consider a distribution on orderings of the stream updates. Namely, we think of a
totally-ordered stream 1, 2, 3, . . . , n of n updates, and in the j-th epoch, we randomly assign
the βj−1k updates among the k servers, independently for each epoch. Let the randomness
used for the assignment in the j-th epoch be denoted σj .
Consider the global stream of updates 1, 2, 3, . . . , n. Suppose we maintain a sample set P
of s items without replacement. We let Pκ denote a random variable indicating the value of P
after seeing κ updates in the stream. We will use the following lemma about reservoir sampling.
Lemma 9. For any constant q, 0 < q < 1, there is a constant C ′ = C ′(q) > 0 for which
• P changes at least C ′s log (n/s) times with probability at least 1− q, and
• If s < k/8 and k = ω(1) and ξ = ω(1), then with probability at least 1 − q/2, over the
choice of {Pκ}, there are at least (1 − (q/8))ξ epochs for which the number of times P
changes in the epoch is at least C ′s log(1 + (k/s)).
Proof. Consider the stream 1, 2, 3, . . . , n of updates. In the classical reservoir sampling algo-
rithm Knuth (1981), P is initialized to {1, 2, 3, . . . , s}. Then, for each κ > s, the κ-th element
is included in the current sample set Pκ with probability s/κ, in which case a random item in
Pκ−1 is replaced with κ.
For the first part of Lemma 9, let Xκ be an indicator random variable if κ causes P to
change. Let X =
∑n
κ=1Xκ. Hence, E [Xκ] = s/κ for all κ, and E [X] = Hn − Hs, where
Hκ = lnκ + O(1) is the κ-th Harmonic number. Then all of the Xκ, κ > s are independent
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indicator random variables. It follows by a Chernoff bound that
Pr[X < E [X] /2] ≤ exp(E [X] /8) ≤ exp(−(lnn/s)/8)
≤
( s
n
)1/8
.
For any s = o(n), this is less than any constant q, and so the first part of Lemma 9 follows
since E [X] /2 = 1/2 · ln(n/s).
For the second part of Lemma 9, consider the j-th epoch, j > 0, which contains βj−1k
consecutive updates. Let Yj be the number of changes in this epoch. Then E [Yj ] = s lnβ+O(1).
Since Yj can be written as a sum of independent indicator random variables, by a Chernoff
bound,
Pr[Yj < E [Yj ] /2] ≤ exp(−E [Yj ] /8)
≤ exp(−(s lnβ +O(1))/8)
≤ 1
βs/8
.
Hence, the expected number of epochs j for which Yj < E [Yj ] /2 is at most
∑ξ−1
j=1
1
βs/8
, which
is o(ξ) since we’re promised that s < k/8 and k = ω(1) and ξ = ω(1). By a Markov bound,
with probability at least 1 − q/2, at most o(ξ/q) = o(ξ) epochs j satisfy Yj ≥ E [Yj ] /2. It
follows that with probability at least 1 − q/2, there are at least (1 − q/8)ξ epochs i for which
the number Yj of changes in the epoch j is at least E [Yj ] /2 ≥ 12s lnβ, as desired.
Corner Cases: When s ≥ k/8, the statement of Theorem 7 gives a lower bound of
Ω(s log(n/s)). In this case Theorem 7 follows immediately from the first part of Lemma 9
since the changes implied by the first part Lemma 9 in P must be communicated to the central
coordinator. Hence, in what follows we can assume s < k/8. Notice also that if k = O(1), then
k log(n/s)
log(1+(k/s)) = O(s log(n/s)), and so the theorem is independent of k, and follows simply by the
first part of Lemma 9. Notice also that if ξ = O(1), then the statement of Theorem 7 amounts
to proving an Ω(k) lower bound, which follows trivially since every site must send at least one
message.
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Thus, in what follows, we may apply the second part of Lemma 9.
Main Case: Let C > 0 be a sufficiently small constant, depending on q, to be determined
below. Let Π be a possibly randomized protocol, which with probability at least q, sends at
most Ckξ messages. We show that Π cannot be a correct protocol.
Let τ denote the random coin tosses of Π, i.e., the concatenation of random strings of all k
sites together with that of the central coordinator.
Let E be the event that Π sends less than Ckξ messages. By assumption, Prτ [E ] ≥ q. Hence,
it is also the case that
Pr
τ,{Pj},{σj}
[E ] ≥ q.
For a sufficiently small constant C ′ > 0 that may depend on q, let F be the event that there
are at least (1 − (q/8))ξ epochs for which the number of times P changes in the epoch is at
least C ′s log(1 + (k/s)). By the second part of Lemma 9,
Pr
τ,{Pj},{σj}
[F ] ≥ 1− q/2.
It follows that there is a fixing of τ = τ ′ as well as a fixing of P0,P1, . . . ,Pξ to P ′0, P ′1, . . . , P ′ξ
for which F occurs and
Pr
{σj}
[E | τ = τ ′, (P0,P1, . . . ,Pξ) = (P ′0, P ′1, . . . , P ′ξ)]
≥ q − q/2 = q/2.
Notice that the three (sets of) random variables τ, {Pj}, and {σj} are independent, and so in
particular, {σj} is still uniformly random given this conditioning.
By a Markov argument, if event E occurs, then there are at least (1 − (q/8))ξ epochs for
which at most (8/q) · C · k messages are sent. If events E and F both occur, then by a union
bound, there are at least (1− (q/4))ξ epochs for which at most (8/q) · C · k messages are sent
and S changes in the epoch at least C ′s log(1 + (k/s)) times. Call such an epoch balanced.
Let j∗ be the epoch which is most likely to be balanced, over the random choices of {σj},
conditioned on τ = τ ′ and (P0,P1, . . . ,Pξ) = (P ′0, P ′1, . . . , P ′ξ). Since at least (1−(q/4))ξ epochs
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are balanced if E and F occur, and conditioned on (P0,P1, . . . ,Pξ) = (P ′0, P ′1, . . . , P ′ξ) event F
does occur, and E occurs with probability at least q/2 given this conditioning, it follows that
Pr
{σj}
[j∗ is balanced | τ = τ ′, (P0,P1, . . . ,Pξ) = (P ′0, P ′1, . . . , P ′ξ)]
≥ q/2− q/4 = q/4.
The property of j∗ being balanced is independent of σj′ for j′ 6= j∗, so we also have
Pr
σj∗
[j∗ is balanced | τ = τ ′, (P0,P1, . . . ,Pξ) = (P ′0, P ′1, . . . , P ′ξ)]
≥ q/4.
If C ′s log(1 + (k/s)) ≥ 1, then P changes at least once in epoch j∗. Suppose, for the moment,
that this is the case. Suppose the first update in the global stream at which P changes is the
j∗-th update. In order for j∗ to be balanced for at least a q/4 fraction of the σj∗ , there must be
at least qk/4 different servers which receive j∗, for which Π sends a message. In particular, since
Π is deterministic conditioned on τ , at least qk/4 messages must be sent in the j∗-th epoch.
But j∗ was chosen so that at most (8/q) · C · k messages are sent, which is a contradiction for
C < q2/32.
It follows that we reach a contradiction unless C ′s log(1 + (k/s)) < 1. Notice, though, that
since C ′ is a constant, if C ′s log(1 + (k/s)) < 1, then this implies that k = O(1). However,
if k = O(1), then k log(n/s)log(1+(k/s)) = O(s log(n/s)), and so the theorem is independent of k, and
follows simply by the first part of Lemma 9.
Otherwise, we have reached a contradiction, and so it follows that Ckξ messages must be
sent with probability at least 1− q. Since Ckξ = Ω
(
k log(n/s)
log(1+(k/s))
)
, this completes the proof.
4.5 Analysis Under Skew
For analyzing the performance in the case of skew, we consider the following model of arrival
of data. Suppose a set of parameters pi, i = 1 . . . k, one per site, such that
∑k
i=1 pi = 1. Each
new arrival into the system is sent to stream Si with a probability of pi. The pis need not
be equal, so that the numbers of elements seen by different sites can be significantly different
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from each other. Note that we do not present an algorithm tailored for this model of arrival.
Instead, we analyze the same algorithm as before, under this model. The main result of this
section is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The method described in Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 continuously maintains a sample
of a distributed system with an expected total number of messages O
(
s log(n/s)
∑
i,pi 6=0
1
log( 2
pi
)
)
over n arrivals.
In our algorithm, all communication is initiated by the sites. Note that in our analysis in
Section 4.3, we make use of an algorithm, Algorithm B, where at the end of an epoch there
is communication initiated by the coordinator. Algorithm B is only to help with the analysis,
and in our algorithm, no communication is initiated by the coordinator. Hence, if pi = 0 for
some site i, then the site will not receive any elements, and will not send any messages to the
coordinator. We can ignore such sites and henceforth, we assume that for each site i, pi > 0.
For the purpose of analysis, we divide the execution of the system into epochs. Unlike
Section 4.3, where epochs were defined globally, we define epochs differently for different sites
here. For each site i where pi 6= 0, let ρi = 2pi . The jth epoch at site i, for j = 1 . . . is defined
inductively as follows. The first epoch at site i is the first sρi elements received in the system
(note this is not the number of elements received in Si, but the number of elements in S). For
j ≥ 2, the jth epoch at site i consists of the next sρji arrivals in the system after the (j − 1)th
epoch.
Lemma 10. The number of epochs at site i is no more than
⌈
log(n/2s)
log ρi
⌉
.
Proof. Let η(r) be the number of elements received by the system in epoch r of site i, and ζ(r)
be the total number of elements received by the system until (and including) epoch r of site i.
ζ(r) =
r∑
j=1
η(r) =
r∑
j=1
sρji ≤ 2sρri
The final inequality above is true since ρi ≥ 2. When there are n elements observed so far,
there are `i epochs for site i. We set ζ(`i) = n, and conclude `i =
⌈
log(n/2s)
log ρi
⌉
.
For site i and epoch j, let Xji denote the number of messages sent by site i to the coordinator
in epoch j.
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Lemma 11.
E
[
Xji
]
≤ (s+ 1)
Proof. Consider the jth epoch at site i. Suppose that the elements that arrived in the system
during this epoch are Q = {e1, e2, · · · , eρji }. We split Q into two parts: 1) Q1 is the set of all
elements observed before site i sends the first message to the coordinator in its jth epoch; and
2) Q2 is the set of the remaining elements in the epoch.
After observing Q1, site i sends out one message. Let X
j
i,2 be the number of messages that
site i sends to the coordinator when observing Q2. Note that X
j
i = 1 +X
j
i,2.
For each element e in Q2, let X
j
i,2(e) be a random variable defined as follows. X
j
i,2(e) = 1 if
site i sends a message to coordinator after receiving element e, and 0 otherwise. Note that for
site i to send a message to the coordinator upon receiving an element e in part 2 of the epoch,
the random number chosen for this element must be smaller than the sth smallest random
weights in the first (j − 1) epochs at site i.
Pr
[
Xji,2(e) = 1
]
= Pr [e was sent to i] ·
Pr
[
Xji,2(e) = 1|e was sent to i
]
≤ pi · s
2sρj−1i
=
pi
2ρj−1i
Note that Xji,2 =
∑
e∈Q2 X
j
i,2(e), and |Q2| ≤ sρji .
E
[
Xji,2
]
=
∑
e∈Q2
Pr
[
Xji,2(e) = 1
]
≤ sρji ·
pi
2ρj−1i
=
spiρi
2
= s
Therefore, we conclude E
[
Xji
]
= 1 + E
[
Xji,2
]
≤ (s+ 1).
Proof of Theorem 3. Let Xi be the total number of messages sent by site i, and let X be the
total number of messages sent by all sites. Note that Xi =
∑ξi
j=1X
j
i and X =
∑k
i=1Xi, where
ξi is the number of epochs at site i. Using Lemma 10, we get:
E [Xi] =
ξi∑
j=1
E
[
Xji
]
≤ (s+ 1)ξi ≤ (s+ 1) log(n/2s)
log ρi
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E [X] =
k∑
i=1
E [Xi] ≤
k∑
i=1
(s+ 1) log(n/2s)
log ρi
Observation 1. With a uniform data distribution, i.e. pi =
1
k , the upper bound of communi-
cation complexity in Theorem 3 is of the same order as the upper bound from Lemma 8.
Proof. For pi =
1
k , ρi =
2
pi
= 2k. Using Theorem 3, with a uniform distribution, the communi-
cation complexity is bounded by O
(
ks log(n/2s)log(2k)
)
.
Using Lemma 8, the communication complexity is E [µ] ≤ (k+4rs+2)
(
log(n/s)
log r + 2
)
. If we
choose r = 2k, this expression is O
(
ks log(n/s)log 2k
)
, which is of the same order as the expression
derived from Theorem 3.
The following theorem makes use of Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 4 below.
Theorem 4. For the CMYZ algorithm, the expected message complexity is unaffected by the
skew, and is Θ(k logk/s n+ s log n) under any element distribution.
Proof. In the CMYZ algorithm, the execution is divided into rounds (see Algorithms 4, 5 where
we have reproduced a description of these algorithms). In each round a sample is collected at
the coordinator, and when the size of this sample reaches s, the coordinator broadcasts a signal
to advance to the next round.
In Algorithm 5 (coordinator), it is clear that for a given round, it does not matter who
communicates with the coordinator during the round, the messages sent by the coordinator
within the round are the same – there is a single broadcast from the coordinator to all the
sites. From Algorithm 4, we see that the communication between a site and the coordinator
also depends only on the round number and the random bit string assigned to an element, and
is unaffected by which site actually sees the element. Hence, if we redistribute the elements
to sites in a different manner, but kept the random bit strings (for each elements) the same,
then the same set of elements will lead to messages to the coordinator as before. Hence, the
communication from the site to the coordinator, and the progression from one round to another,
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are both unaffected by skew. Overall, we see that both the sequence of messages sent by the
sites to the coordinator, and the messages from the coordinator to the site, are unaffected by
the actual distribution of elements across sites.
4.6 Sampling With Replacement
We now present an algorithm to maintain a random sample of size s with replacement from
S. The basic idea is as follows. Let the algorithm from Section 4.2, when specialized to maintain
a random sample of size one, be called the “single item algorithm”. To maintain a random
sample of size s, we run s independent copies of the single item algorithm. When there is a
query for a random sample of size s, we return the (multi-set) union of the samples returned by
the s copies. Since each element in the set returned is chosen uniformly at random from S, the
returned set is indeed a random sample chosen from S with replacement. Performed naively,
this will lead to a message complexity of O
(
sk lognlog k
)
. We obtain an improved algorithm based
on the following ideas.
We view the distributed streams as s logical streams, Sδ, δ = 1 . . . s. Each Sδ is identical to
S, but the algorithm assigns independent weights to the different copies of the same element in
the different logical streams. Let wδ(e) denote the weight assigned to element e in Sδ. wδ(e)
is a random number between 0 and 1. For each δ = 1 . . . s, the coordinator maintains the
minimum weight, say wδ, among all elements in Sδ, and the corresponding element.
Let β = maxsδ=1w
δ; β is maintained by the coordinator. Each site i maintains βi, a local
view of β, which is always greater than or equal to β. Whenever a logical stream element at site
i has weight less than βi, the site sends it to the coordinator, receives in response the current
value of β, and updates βi. When there is a query at the coordinator, it returns the set of all
minimum weight elements in all s logical streams. It can be easily seen that this algorithm is
correct, and at all times, returns a random sample of size s selected with replacement. The
main optimization relative to the naive approach described above is that when a site sends
a message to the coordinator, it receives β, which provides partial information about all wδs.
This provides a substantial improvement in the message complexity and leads to the following
bounds.
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Theorem 5. The above algorithm continuously maintains a sample of size s with replace-
ment from S, and its expected message complexity is O(s log s log n) in case k ≤ 2s log s, and
O
(
k logn
log
(
k
s log s
)
)
in case k > 2s log s.
Proof. The analysis of the message complexity is similar to the case of sampling without re-
placement. We sketch the analysis here. The execution is divided into epochs, where in epoch
j, the value of β at the coordinator decreases by at least a factor of r (a parameter to be
determined later). Let ξ denote the number of epochs. It can be seen that E [ξ] = O
(
logn
log r
)
.
In epoch j, let Xj denote the number of messages sent from the sites to the coordinator in the
epoch, mj denote the value of β at the beginning of the epoch, and nj denote the number of
elements in S that arrived in the epoch.
The nj elements in epoch j give rise to snj logical elements, and each logical element has
a probability of no more than mj of resulting in a message to the coordinator. Similar to
the proof of Lemma 6, we can show using conditional expectations that E [Xj ] ≤ rs log s (the
log s factor comes in due to the fact that E [nj |mj = α] ≤ r log sα . Thus the expected total
number of messages in epoch i is bounded by (k + 2sr log s), and in the entire execution is
O
(
(k + 2sr log s) lognlog r
)
. By choosing r = 2 for the case k ≤ (2s log s), and r = k/(s log s) for
the case k > (2s log s), we get the desired result.
4.7 Experiments
We report on an experimental evaluation of our algorithm. We implemented our algorithm
using Java, and tested it on data derived from an OC48 Internet Trace CAIDA OC48 Trace
Project (2006), which has anonymous traffic traces taken at a US west coast OC48 peering link
for a large ISP in 2002 and 2003. The dataset has 42,268,510 elements. We also evaluated its
performance on a different dataset (Enron email CALO Project (2009)). But as expected, the
performance of the algorithms do not depend on the specific dataset used, so we only present
the results for the OC48 dataset.
As a point of comparison, we implemented the CMYZ algorithm Cormode et al. (2012).
Each data point in the graph below is the mean of 50 independent runs of the experiment.
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For reference, we reproduce the CMYZ algorithm from Cormode et al. (2012) in Algorithm 4,
and Algorithm 5. Note that our implementation of CMYZ is slightly different from the one
given in Cormode et al. (2012), and corrects their stated algorithm, for the following reason.
In Algorithm 5, Tj is the set of possible samples in the coordinator in round j. Upon request,
the coordinator responds with a sample of size s from Tj ∪ Tj+1. With a small probability
2−(s+1), all elements in Tj+1 at the coordinator will be moved to Tj+2, and the next element
is added to Tj+2 in round j + 1. This will lead to |Tj+2| > s and the size of Tj+2 will not
decrease in the future, and the memory of the coordinator can grow. Therefore, we revise the
condition for the “if” statement (Line 5 in Algorithm 5) to be |Tj+1| ≥ s. Also note that while
our method keeps s elements in the coordinator at all times, CMYZ may require more memory
at the coordinator. In particular, in round j, |Tj | can be large if |Tj+1| < s.
Algorithm 4: Algorithm for site in round j, from CMYZ Cormode et al. (2012).
1 Upon receiving element e, let b(e) be a random bit string assigned to e. ;
2 if the first j bits of b(e) are all zero then send e to Coordinator;
Algorithm 5: Algorithm for the Coordinator in round j, from CMYZ Cormode et al.
(2012).
1 foreach e received do
2 if b(e)[j + 1] = 0 then
3 Tj+1 ← Tj+1 ∪ {e}
4 else Tj ← Tj ∪ {e} ;
5 if |Tj+1| = s then
6 foreach e ∈ Tj+1 do
7 if b(e)[j + 2] = 0 then
8 Tj+2 ← Tj+2 ∪ {e};
9 Tj+1 ← Tj+1\{e};
10 discard Tj ;
11 j ← j + 1 and signal all sites to advance to the next round;
Figure 4.2 shows the number of message transmissions against the number of elements
observed so far. For this set of experiments, each stream element is sent to a site chosen
uniformly at random, so that all sites receive approximately the same number of elements.
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(a) s = 25 (b) s = 50
(c) s = 100
Figure 4.2: The number of messages transmitted as a function of number of elements observed.
The number of sites is set to 20. “CTW” refers to our algorithm while CMYZ is the algorithm
of Cormode et al. Cormode et al. (2012).
37
(a) s = 25 (b) s = 50
(c) s = 100
Figure 4.4: Memory consumption versus stream size for 20 sites.
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In all Figures “CTW” refers to our algorithm while CMYZ is the algorithm of Cormode et
al. Cormode et al. (2012).
From Figure 4.2, we observe that the communication cost of both algorithms have a loga-
rithmic dependence on the number of elements observed so far. As is expected, at the beginning
of the observation, the number of message transmissions grows fast, since an incoming element
has a high probability of being sampled. As more elements are observed, this probability de-
creases. Note that in general, our algorithm has a lower communication cost than CMYZ, and
the benefit of our algorithm increases as the sample size increases from 25 to 100.
The memory consumption of the two methods is presented in Figure 4.4. Note that while
our method consumes a constant amount of memory, CMYZ takes more memory, and its
memory consumption is a random variable.
In Figure 4.6, it shows the message transmission as a function of sample size. The message
complexity increases almost linearly with the sample size, for both algorithms. We observe that
our algorithm performs better on high sample size than CMYZ. In the algorithm of CMYZ,
the procedure remains in the same round if |Tj+1| < s. The sampling probability for any new
coming element in the round is the same. Different from CMYZ, the probability that a new
element is sampled in a epoch is decreasing. With higher sample size, the number of elements in
an epoch/turn increases, which makes CMYZ require more communication than our algorithm.
Figure 4.8 shows the message transmission as a function of number of sites. We observe our
method performs better under these three scenarios. We also observe that when the number
of sites increases, the communication cost of our algorithm gets closer to that of CMYZ. The
reason is that with a greater number of sites, our algorithm is more likely to have sites whose
values of ui are not synchronized with the coordinator. As a result, there are more messages
sent that do not change the sample at the coordinator.
Figure 4.10 shows the message transmission under skew. For this set of experiments, we
selected one site to have a higher probability to receive incoming elements than the other
sites. Thus site 1 receives the next item with probability p, while the remaining sites 2 till
(k − 1) received the element with a probability of (1 − p)/(k − 1). We call the ratio between
the probability of 1 receiving the element and the probability that another site receives it,
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(a) k = 20 (b) k = 40
(c) k = 60
Figure 4.6: Number of messages versus sample size, where k is the number of sites.
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(a) s = 25 (b) s = 50
(c) s = 100
Figure 4.8: Number of messages versus number of sites
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(a) k = 20 (b) k = 40
(c) k = 60
Figure 4.10: Number of messages versus the skew, when sample size is 50.
as the skew in the data. According to theoretical analysis, the performance of our method
should improve with increasing skew, while that of CMYZ should remain constant. From
Figure 4.10 we observe that this is indeed the case, and for larger values of the skew, our
algorithm significantly outperforms CMYZ.
Figure 4.12 shows an experiment with a different type of input. We apply the Zipf Distri-
bution Powers (1998), where the probability of each site receiving new elements, pi, is assigned
to be ciq , where c is normalization constant, and q is a parameter. From Figure 4.12, we note
that the number of messages transmitted decreases when q increases (as the degree of skewness
increases).
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(a) k = 20 (b) k = 40
(c) k = 60
Figure 4.12: Number of messages versus Zipf Distribution variable q, when the sample size is
50.
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CHAPTER 5. DISTINCT RANDOM SAMPLING ON A DISTRIBUTED
DATA STREAM
5.1 Model
We consider a system with k sites, numbered from 1 to k. Each site i monitors a local
stream of elements, which are not all necessarily distinct. There is an integer time associated
with each observation, and time is non-decreasing within a stream. At time t, let Si(t) denote
the stream observed by site i so far, and let S(t) = ∪ki=1Si(t) denote the stream observed by
the system so far. Let D(t) denote the set of distinct elements in S(t), n(t) the number of
elements in S(t), and d(t) the number of distinct elements in S(t).
There is a coordinator node, different from the other k sites, to whom all queries are posed.
The different sites as well as the coordinator are assumed to be synchronized in time, and
we assume that the message delay from the sites to the coordinator are all equal, as in a
synchronous distributed system. These assumptions, which have also been used in previous
works in the continuous distributed streaming model Cormode et al. (2010b, 2008); Tirthapura
and Woodruff (2011), allow us to focus on communication efficiency.
We consider two versions of distinct sampling, based on the scope of the data that the query
addresses. In the infinite window case, at every time instant t, the coordinator must maintain a
random sample of size min{s, d} from D(t). In the sliding window case Datar et al. (2002), we
are given a window size w as a parameter, and the user is interested in all elements that have
arrived in the most recent w time intervals. In particular, let Swi (t) denote the stream that
has arrived at site i at times t− w + 1, t− w + 2, . . . , t, and let Sw(t) = ∪ki=1Si(t). Let Dw(t)
denote the set of distinct elements in in Sw(t). The goal is for the coordinator to maintain at
all times t, a random sample of size min{s, d} from the elements in Dw(t).
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Our measure of performance is the total number of messages sent between the coordinator
and the sites, and we aim to minimize this number. Since each message in our algorithm is of a
small size, this is also a measure of the number of bytes transmitted, in our case. The size1 of
local data stream Si, the order of arrival, the number of distinct elements in the local stream,
and the interleaving of the stream at different sites, can all be arbitrary, and the algorithm
cannot make any assumption about these.
5.2 Infinite Window
We first consider the case of infinite window, when the sample has to be chosen from the
set of all distinct elements seen so far in the stream. Let h : U → [0, 1] be a hash function
that assigns a real number in the range [0, 1] to each element in U . For different inputs, it is
assumed that the outputs of h are mutually independent random variables. For set S, let h(S)
denote {h(x)|x ∈ S}. Note that for any time t, h(S(t)) = h(D(S(t))). The basic sampling
strategy is as follows. The distinct sample at time t is the set of elements from S(t) that yield
the s smallest elements in h(S(t)).
It is clear that the above yields a distinct sample from S(t). To see this, take any subset
T ⊆ D(S(t)) of size s; the probability that the elements in T will yield the s smallest values in
h(D(S(t))) is exactly the probability that in a random permutation of h(D(S(t))), the elements
in T are ordered before the rest, which is 1/
(|D(t)|
s
)
.
Our distributed algorithm for maintaining the above sample is as follows. Let u(t) denote
the value of the sth smallest element in h(S(t)). The coordinator always has the current value
of u(t). Each site i maintains a state variable ui(t), which is its local view of u(t). ui(t)
is initialized to 1 and is updated as follows. Whenever site i observes an item e such that
h(e) < ui(t), e and h(e) are sent to the coordinator, who updates u(t). If h(e) indeed changed
the value of u(t), then e is selected into the sample at the coordinator, replacing a current
element in the sample (unless fewer than s distinct elements have been seen so far). In turn,
the coordinator sends a message back to i to refresh the value of ui(t). The algorithm at site i
1The message size in our algorithm is constant, assuming that each stream element can be stored in a constant
number of bytes.
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is presented in Algorithm 6 and at the coordinator is in Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 6: Infinite Window: Algorithm at Site i
1 Initialization: Receive hash function h from the coordinator; ui ← 1, Pi ← ∅;
2 repeat
3 if receive element e from Si then
4 if h(e) < ui and e 6∈ Pi then
5 Insert e into Pi ;
6 Send e to the Coordinator;
7 if receive element u from the coordinator then
8 ui ← u;
9 Discard all elements e′ in Pi such that h(e′) > ui;
10 until Forever ;
Algorithm 7: Infinite Window: Algorithm at the Coordinator
1 /* P is the random sample, and variable u has the current value of u(t).
*/
2 Initialization: P ← ∅, u← 1;
3 repeat
4 if receive e from site i then
5 if h(e) < u then
6 If e 6∈ P , then insert e into P ;
7 if |P | > s then
8 Discard element e′ = argmax{h(e)|e ∈ P} from P ;
9 Update u← max{h(e)|e ∈ P};
10 Send u to site i;
11 if a query for a random sample arrives then
12 Send P ;
13 until Forever ;
Lemma 12. When queried at time t, the coordinator returns a random sample of size min{s, d}
selected without replacement from D(t).
Proof. First note that at time t, variable ui tracks ui(t) at site i, and u tracks u(t) at the
coordinator. For each site i we claim ui ≥ u at all times. This can be proved using induction.
For the base case, note that initially, ui = u. There are two types of events to consider for the
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inductive step: (1) when u is updated, and (2) when ui is updated. Each time u is updated, it
only becomes smaller (i.e. u is non-increasing), which maintains the invariant. Each time ui is
updated, it is set to the current value of u, which also maintains the invariant.
Assuming that hashes of different elements are distinct, we claim that the value of u equals
the `th smallest hash value seen so far, where ` = min{s, d}. We claim that every time a new
element e arrives at site i such that h(e) < u, e will be sent to the coordinator. To see this,
consider an element e such that h(e) < u, observed at site i. We have u ≤ ui, and h(e) < u;
these together imply that h(e) < ui. From the algorithm at the site, it is clear that e will be
sent to the coordinator. Thus, the coordinator can inductively maintain the ` elements from
D(t) with the smallest hash values. It is clear this constitutes a random sample of size ` chosen
without replacement from D(t).
5.2.1 Infinite Window: Analysis
We present an analysis of the message and space complexities of our algorithm. In Sec-
tion 5.2.1.1 we present an upper bound on the message complexity of our algorithm and in
Section 5.2.1.2 we present a lower bound.
5.2.1.1 Upper Bound
Consider the execution of the algorithm until the end of timestep t. Let d = |D(t)| be
the total number of distinct elements that were observed in the stream. Let di denote the
total number of distinct elements in Si(t). Clearly, di ≤ d. Let Yi denote the total number of
messages that are sent by node i (note that the number of messages sent by site i equals the
number of messages received). Let Y denote the total number of messages sent in the system.
In the following, when the context is clear, we use Si to mean Si(t), Di to mean Di(t), and so
on.
Lemma 13. An element e observed at site i multiple times will not lead to more than one
message transmission from i to the coordinator, and this transmission can only happen the first
time site i observes e.
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Proof. Suppose that e is observed by site i at times t1, t2, . . . where t1 < t2 < . . .. The first time
it is observed at time t1, suppose that a message was not sent to the coordinator. In this case,
h(e) ≥ ui(t1). Since ui is non-increasing, when e is observed at a future time, say t2, it will also
be true that h(e) ≥ ui(t2), and no further messages are sent to the coordinator. Next, suppose
that a message was sent to the coordinator when e was observed at time t1. In this case e is
inserted into Pi at time t1. When e is observed again at time t2 (or later), either e is still in Pi,
or it must be true that ui(t2) < h(e), since otherwise, e would not have been discarded from
Pi. Hence, e will not be sent to the coordinator in this case, according to Algorithm 6.
For j = 1 . . . di, let e
j
i be the jth new distinct element in the local stream Si. For j = 1 . . . di,
let Y ji be a random variable equal to 1 if site i communicated with the coordinator upon
receiving eji , and 0 otherwise. We have Yi =
∑di
j=1 Y
j
i .
Lemma 14. For site i, and j = 1 . . . di, Pr
[
Y ji = 1
]
≤ sj , if j > s.
Proof. Let Zji denote the event that h(e
j
i ) is among the s smallest elements in {h(eqi )|q = 1 . . . j}.
Note that if Y ji = 1, then Z
j
i must be true. Note that the converse is not necessarily true; it is
possible that Zji is true, but Y
j
i = 0, for example, e
j
i may have already been observed by a site
other than i, and its value may have been incorporated into u, and hence into ui. It is easy to
see that Pr
[
Zji
]
= sj for j > s. Since Pr
[
Y ji = 1
]
≤ Pr
[
Zji
]
, the lemma follows.
Lemma 15.
E [Yi] ≤ s+ s (Hdi −Hs)
Proof. Using linearity of expectation on Yi, we get:
E [Yi] =
di∑
j=1
E
[
Y ji
]
=
di∑
j=1
Pr
[
Y ji = 1
]
=
s∑
j=1
Pr
[
Y ji = 1
]
+
di∑
j=s+1
Pr
[
Y ji = 1
]
≤ s+
di∑
j=s+1
s
j
= s+ s (Hdi −Hs)
where we have used Lemma 14.
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Lemma 16. Let Y denote the number of messages transmitted by the distributed algorithm
during an execution when d distinct elements are observed overall.
E [Y ] ≤ 2ks+ 2ks (Hd −Hs) ≈ 2ks
(
1 + ln
(
d
s
))
Proof. Note that for each message sent by a site, there is exactly one message sent by the
coordinator, and hence we have Y = 2
∑k
i=1 Yi. The proof follows from Lemma 15 combined
with the observation di ≤ d.
We remark that using Lemma 15, it is possible to get a tighter upper bound for E [Y ] in
cases when the numbers of distinct elements observed at individual sites is much smaller than
the number of distinct elements overall.
Observation 2.
E [Y ] ≤ 2ks+ 2s
k∑
i=1
(Hdi −Hs) ≈ 2ks+ 2s
k∑
i=1
ln
(
di
s
)
The following theorem summarizes the performance of the algorithm for infinite windows.
Theorem 6. Let d, s, and k respectively denote the total number of distinct elements in the
distributed stream, sample size, and the number of sites. There is an algorithm that continuously
maintains a distinct sample without replacement of a distributed stream, whose expected total
number of messages is no more than 2ks ln
(
de
s
)
, memory consumption per site is O(s), memory
consumption at the coordinator is O(s), and processing time per element is O(1).
Proof. The message complexity follows from Lemma 16. The memory at the coordinator is
also clear from an inspection of Algorithm 7. For the memory at site i, note that as soon as
an element e is inserted into Pi, e is also sent to the coordinator, and in turn the site receives
the current value of u, sets ui ← u, and discards all elements e from Pi such that h(e) > u.
Globally, there are no more than s distinct elements e such that h(e) ≤ u, hence even within
site i, there are no more than s elements in Pi.
5.2.1.2 Lower Bound
Given any distributed algorithm A that continuously maintains a distinct sample without
replacement of size s, we construct an input which causes A to send at least a certain minimum
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number of messages, in expectation. Suppose that the elements were all chosen from the set
[m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m} for m  k. Note that the probability space here is the one from which
the random sample is chosen; every algorithm needs access to random bits that define this
probability space, such that the sample chosen is uniformly chosen from the set of all distinct
elements observed so far.
Lemma 17. Suppose a set D of distinct elements of size d has already been observed by the
system so far, after some rounds of computation. For any algorithm A, and any site i = 1 . . . k,
there is an element eDi such that upon receiving any element e ∈ [m]−eDi −D in the next round,
site i will send a message to the coordinator with probability at least s2(d+1) .
Proof. We use proof by contradiction. Note that set D has already been observed by the system.
Suppose that there were two distinct elements ei, e
′
i ∈ [m]−D such that upon receiving ei, the
probability that site i sent a message to the coordinator was less than s2(d+1) , and also upon
receiving e′i, the probability that i sent a message to the coordinator was less than
s
2(d+1) .
Consider the following two inputs in the next round. In one input I1, site i is given ei and
the other sites do not receive any element. In the other input I2, site i is given e′i and the other
sites do not receive an element. In I1, at the end of this round, there is a probability of sd+1
that ei belongs to the random sample. In I2, at the end of this round, there is a probability of
s
d+1 that e
′
i belongs to the random sample. Thus, with probability at least
s
d+1 , the sample at
the coordinator after observing I1 is different from the sample after observing I2.
However, in this round, the coordinator observes a change in execution between I1 or I2
only if either (1) site i sends a message to the coordinator in I1, or (2) site i sends a message
to the coordinator in I2. The probability that at least one of the above events happen is less
than sd+1 , using the union bound. Further, the behavior of the other sites has an identical
distribution on both inputs, since they did not receive any element.
Thus, we have that the contents of the random sample at the end of the round are different
with probability at least sd+1 , but the probability that the messages observed by the coordinator
are different is less than sd+1 . This leads to a non-zero probability that the random sample at the
coordinator is incorrect at the end of this round, and hence a contradiction. Hence, there can
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be at most one element ei such that upon receiving an element e ∈ [m]−ei−D, the probability
of sending a message to the coordinator is at least s2(d+1) , and the lemma follows.
Lemma 18. Suppose the set of distinct elements observed so far is D, and let d = |D|, and
d ≥ s. For any algorithm A, there exists another round of input I(D) such that after observing
I(D), the sites will send at least an expected ks2(d+1) elements to the coordinator.
Proof. The input I(D) is constructed as follows. Let e be any element such that e 6∈ (D ∪ (∪ki=1{eDi })).
Element e is given to every site in this round. Using Lemma 17, we get that each site i = 1 . . . k
will send a message to the coordinator with probability at least s2(d+1) . The lemma follows.
Theorem 7. For any algorithm A, there exists an input distributed stream, IA with d distinct
elements such that the expected number of messages sent by the algorithm upon receiving IA is
at least ks2 (Hd −Hs + 1) ≈ ks2 ln
(
de
s
)
.
Proof. Input IA is constructed as follows. Let D0 = ∅. The input in the first round is I(D0).
For i ≥ 0, let the set of all distinct elements observed till (and including) round i be Di. Note
that the size of Di is exactly i. For i = 0 . . . (d− 1), the input in round i+ 1 is I(Di).
From Lemma 18, in round i > s, the expected number of messages sent to the coordinator
is at least ks2(i+1) . Summing this over all rounds s+ 1, . . . , d, we get the number of messages to
be at least ks(Hd−Hs)2 . For rounds 1 till s, similar methods yield that the expected number of
messages sent in each round must be at least k2 , for the above input. Thus the expected total
number of messages sent by this algorithm is at least ks(Hd−Hs)2 +
ks
2 =
ks
2 (Hd −Hs + 1).
5.2.2 Sampling With Replacement
Thus far, we have considered distinct sampling without replacement. In sampling with
replacement, the s different samples are all chosen independently and randomly from the set of
distinct elements observed so far, D(t). A possible solution to distinct sampling with replace-
ment is to repeat s parallel copies of the single element sampling algorithm, each copy using
a different hash function. The correctness of this scheme is trivial, and the message cost is s
times the cost of a single element sampling algorithm, which is O(ks log de).
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We can do better, using the following observation. When node i receives element e, it sends
only a single copy of e to the coordinator if it was sampled by one or more of the s parallel
copies (of the single element sampling algorithm).
Theorem 8. There is an algorithm that continuously maintain a distinct sample with replace-
ment of a distributed stream. Let d, s, and k denotes the total number of distinct elements
in the distributed data stream, sample size and the number of sites. The expected number of
messages is bounded by O(ks log(de/s)).
Proof. For site i and the jth distinct element received by the site, let Y ji be a random variable
equal to 1 if the site communicated with the coordinator upon receiving this element, and 0
otherwise.
Pr
[
Y ji = 1
]
=
 1 j ≤ s1− (1− 1j)s j > s
Let Yi denote the total number of messages sent by site i, and Yi =
∑di
j=1 Y
j
i , where di is the
number of distinct elements received by site i during execution.
E [Yi] =
di∑
j=1
E
[
Y ji
]
= s+
di∑
j=s+1
(
1−
(
1− 1
j
)s)
≤ s+
di∑
j=s+1
(
1− e− sj
)
≤ s+
di∑
j=s+1
s
j
= s+ s(Hdi −Hs)
≤ s ln die
s
Thus the expected total number of messages in the system is bounded by O(ks log(de/s)),
even for the algorithm for sampling with replacement.
We also note the following reduction from distinct sampling without replacement to distinct
sampling with replacement. From a distinct sample with replacement of size slightly greater
than s, we select a random sample without replacement.
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Lemma 19. In a distinct sample with replacement of size s+1, it is expected to have s distinct
elements.
Proof. Let ρj denote the number of repeated element j in the distinct sample with replacement.
Pr
[
ρj = η
]
=
(
1
d
)η
, where d is the total number of distinct elements observed from the data stream. We can
derive the expected number of repeated element j is E
[
ρj
] ≤ 1d−1 . Let ρ be the number of
duplicate elements in the distinct sample with replacement of size s, E [ρ] ≤ ∑sj=1 E [ρj]. If
we wish to maintain a distinct sample with replacement with s distinct elements, we expect
there is 1 duplicate element in the distinct sample. In a distinct sample with replacement of
size s+ 1, we can have s distinct elements.
The distinct sample without replacement from a distinct sample with replacement of size
of s+ 1 is the same as a distinct sample without replacement from the original dataset.
Theorem 9. For any algorithm A, it maintains a distinct random sample with replacement
of size s. There exist an input distributed stream, IA with d distinct elements such that the
expected number of messages sent by the algorithm upon receiving IA is at least ks2 ln
(
de
s
)
.
Proof. By the reduction from distinct sampling without replacement to distinct sampling with
replacement, we can maintain a distinct random sample without replacement of size s from a
distinct random sample with replacement of size s + 1. From Theorem 7, the lower bound of
Ω(ks log(ds )) applies to both sampling with and without replacement, and our method leads to
an algorithm for sampling with replacement with optimal message complexity.
5.3 Sliding Window
In the sliding window case, a sample algorithm is desired over only a window of most recent
elements of the stream. We assume that time is divided into “timesteps” that are numbered
consecutively in an increasing sequence. It is assumed that time is synchronized across the sites
so that when site 1 is observing elements in timestep t, other sites are also observing elements
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in the same timestep. Let w > 0 be an integer denoting the size of the window. The problem is
as follows: when a query is issued to the coordinator at timestep t, it returns a random sample
of size s chosen without replacement from the set of all distinct elements observed in timesteps
(t− w + 1) till t, both endpoints inclusive.
Algorithm Idea At timestep t, let Si(t, w) denote the elements that have arrived in
timestep (t−w+ 1) till t at site i. Let S(t, w) denote ∪ki=1Si(t, w). Let Di(t, w) denote the set
of distinct elements in Si(t, w), and D(t, w) the set of distinct elements in S(t, w). For a set of
elements E, let h(E) = {h(e)|e ∈ E}. The high-level algorithm idea is to choose the elements
with the s smallest hash values from D(t, w). Let u(t, w) denote the s-th smallest hash value
from h(D(t, w)).
Implementation of the Idea The challenge in implementing the sliding windows sce-
nario, when compared with the infinite window scenario, is that u(t, w) is not monotonically
decreasing. As elements expire from the window, the value of u(t, w) may increase, and an
algorithm has to keep track of this at both the coordinator and the sites. One possible method
is as follows. Each site i, at timestep t, keeps track of the set of s elements with the smallest
hash values, chosen from Si(t, w). The coordinator maintains the local distinct sample for each
site. Upon request, the coordinator choose the distinct samples with s smallest hash value
from the union of local distinct samples. Note that this also forms a distinct sample from
Si(t, w). Whenever this sample changes, the coordinator is informed. Since the coordinator
has all elements with the s smallest hash values from each site, it can maintain elements with
the globally s smallest hash values from D(t, w), and hence a distinct sample from S(t, w). The
message complexity of this algorithm depends on how often the local samples at the individual
sites change.
We can reduce the communication cost of the above algorithm by incorporating feedback
from the coordinator to the site as follows. Each site maintains a local sliding window distinct
sample, and the coordinator maintains the local sample of each site and as well as the global
sample. Let DS(t) be the distinct sample in the coordinator chosen from D(t, w), and DSi(t)
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be the distinct sample in site i. Every time there are changes in the local sample, the site sends
an update to the coordinator. The coordinator feedbacks to site i by conveying the difference
of DS(t) and DSi(t), F = DS(t) −DSi(t). Once receiving the feedback F , the site puts the
feedback into its local sample. Note that, after receiving the feedback from the coordinator,
the local sample is the same as the global sample, DSi(t) = DS(t).
We observe that in the previous algorithm, the useful information in the feedback is the sth
smallest hash value and the nearest expire timestep: the former filters unnecessary elements,
and the later keeps the coordinator up to date. We can further reduce the communication cost
by conveying the sth smallest hash value and the most recent expire timestep. The coordinator
maintains a global distinct sample DS(t) of size s and k local distinct samples DSi(t); in
addition, it keeps track of the sth smallest hash value u and the nearest expire timestep, t∗, in
DS(t). Each site maintains its local distinct sample DSi(t), and its view of the global state:
ui, and ti. Every time a new element e arrives at site i at timestep t, site i samples e if
h(e) < ui. Whenever DSi(t) changes, it send a message about the changes to the coordinator.
Upon receiving the message, the coordinator updates DSi(t). If h(e) < u, it also updates the
global distinct sample DS(t), u, and t∗. The coordinator then feedback (u, t∗) to site i, and
site i updates its ui and t
∗.
It is known that in general, maintaining the kth smallest element within a sliding window
requires space linear in the window size in the worst case Datar et al. (2002). However, in
our case, we do not need to maintain the minima over arbitrary numbers, but need to do
so over a sequence of random numbers. Hence, we can use the idea from priority sampling
similar to Babcock et al. (2002) to significantly reduce the space consumption at each site.
For elements e, e′ and timesteps t, t′, we say that tuple (e, t) dominates tuple (e′, t′) at site i if
t > t′ and h(e) < h(e′). Let τi(e) denote the most recent time when e was observed at site i.
For elements e, e′, we say e dominates e′ at site i if (e, τi(e)) dominates (e′, τi(e′)). Each site
i has a data structure Ti consisting of all elements that could potentially be included within
the random sample of distinct elements either now, or in the future. Ti can be maintained
efficiently using a Treap Seidel and Aragon (1996).
The algorithm at the site is presented in Algorithm 8, and at the coordinator in Algorithm 9.
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Algorithm 8: Sliding Window: sampling algorithm at site i.
1 /* DSi is the local distinct sample of size s at site i. */
2 /* Ti is the set of all tuples that may potentially get into the sample in
the future. Note that DSi and Ti are disjoint. */
3 /* ui is sth smallest hash value in DSi */
4 /* ti is the smallest timestep in DSi */
5 Initialization: ui ← 1, ti ← 0, DSi ← ∅, Ti ← ∅;
6 repeat
7 if Current timestep moves to t′ then
8 Remove expired tuples from DSi and Ti; i.e., all tuples with timestep < t’;
9 while |DSi| < s do
10 Poll tuple (e, t) with the smallest hash value from Ti;
11 DSi ← DSi ∪ {(e, t)};
12 ui ← the sth smallest hash value in DSi;
13 ti ← the smallest timestep in DSi;
14 Send all the changes in DSi to the coordinator;
15 if Receive a tuple (e, t) then
16 if h(e) < ui then
17 DSi ← DSi ∪ {(e, t+ w − 1)};
18 if |DSi| > s then
19 Poll tuple (e′, t′) with the largest hash value from DSi;
20 Ti ← Ti ∪ {(e′, t′)};
21 ;
22 u′ ← the sth smallest hash value in DSi;
23 t′ ← the smallest timestep in DSi;
24 ui ← min{u′, ui};
25 ti ← min{t′, ti};
26 Remove tuples (e’, t’) in Ti where h(e
′) ≥ ui and t′ < ti;
27 Send all the changes in DSi to the coordinator;
28 else
29 Ti ← Ti ∪ {(e, t+ w − 1)} ;
30 if Receive feedback, u and t∗, from the coordinator then
31 ui ← u;
32 ti ← t∗;
33 until Forever ;
56
Algorithm 9: Sliding Window: Sampling Algorithm at the coordinator
1 /* DSci is the coordinator’s view of local distinct sample at site i. */
2 /* DS is the global distinct sample of size s at the coordinator. */
3 /* u is sth smallest hash value in DS */
4 /* t∗ is the smallest timestep in DS */
5 Initialization: u← 1, t∗ ← 0 DS ← ∅, DSci ← ∅, ∀i repeat
6 if Current timestep moves to t then
7 UpdateDistinctSample();
8 if Receive (e, t) from site i at timestep t′ then
9 DSci ← DSci ∪ {(e, t)};
10 UpdateDistinctSample();
11 Feedback (u, t∗) to site i;
12 if A query arrives for a sample from D(t, w) then
13 Return DS.
14 until Forever ;
15 Function UpdateDistinctSample()
16 Remove expired tuples from DSci ;
17 DS ← the s tuples with smallest hash value in ∪ki=1DSi;
18 u← the sth smallest hash value in DS;
19 t∗ ← the smallest timestep in DS;
Lemma 20. When queried at time t, the coordinator returns a distinct random sample of size
min{s, |D(t, w)|}, selected without replacement from D(t, w).
Proof. Note that at time t, each site maintains its view of u, ui, and the expire timestep of ui,
ti. For each site i, we claim that ui ≥ u at all time. We prove this by induction. We use ui(t)
and u(t) to indicate the value of ui and u at timestep t. Assume that a site gets its feedback
from the coordinator at time t, ui(t) = u(t), there are three types of events to consider for the
inductive: 1) when u(t) is updated, 2) when ui(t) is updated, and 3) when u(t) is expired.
When u(t) changes, there are two possible events: 1) u(t) increases, and 2) u(t) decreases.
That u(t) increases is caused by elements in DS(t) expired, t∗ ≤ t. As each site maintains an
expire time of u(t), ti, from our algorithm, it builds distinct elements DSi(t) from DSi(t) ∪
Ti(t), where Ti(t) stores all non-dominated elements at site i at timestep t, and sends to
the coordinator. When u(t) increases, all sites actively communicate with the coordinator;
ui(t) = u(t), which maintains the invariant. When u(t) decreases, the coordinator must sample
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a distinct element with lower hash value and with the expire timestep > t∗. It can be proved
by contradiction. If there is an element with h(e) > ui(t), in any condition, the element is
not sampled. If there is an element with h(e) < ui(t) and with expire timestep ≤ t∗, the
element must have been sampled in the previous timestep. Each site maintains ui(t) = u(τ),
t− w + 1 ≤ τ ≤ t. As u(t) decrease if ti > t, ui(t) ≥ u(t). The invariant remains.
When ui(t) changes, site i actively notifies the coordinator, and receives feedback. If ui(t) is
expired, site i rebuilds the sample from DSi(t)∪Ti(t), and sends out message to the coordinator.
ui(t) = u(t) in this case, which maintains the invariant. When u(t) is expired, the sites actively
communicates with the coordinator. ui(t) ≥ u(t), which maintains the invariant.
Assuming the hash value of different elements are distinct, we claim that the coordinator
maintains a distinct random sample of size min{s, |D(t, w)|}, selected without replacement from
D(t, w). Suppose that at time t, the coordinator maintains a distinct random sample DS(t)
of size `, where ` = min{s, |D(t, w)|}, and u is the `th smallest hash value in DS(t). When
site i receives an element e, in our algorithm, the element is either dropped or sampled, and
is sent to the coordinator. If e is dropped by site i, h(e) > ui(t). From the statement above,
ui(t) ≥ u(t), h(e) > ui(t) ≥ u(t). The element e will not be sampled by the coordinator either.
If e is sampled by site i, it is sent to the coordinator. The coordinator can inductively maintain
the ` elements from D(t, w).
It is clear to conclude that the coordinator using our algorithm maintains a distinct random
sample of size min{s, |D(t, w)|}, selected without replacement from D(t, w), and answer queries
upon receival.
5.3.1 Sliding Window Analysis
Lemma 21. Let di(t) be the number of distinct elements observed at timestep t at site i. For
any site i, the expected number of messages transmitted from the site to the coordinator at
timestep t is at most sdi(t−w)|Di(t−1,w)| +
sdi(t)
|Di(t,w)| .
Proof. We observe that the message sent to the coordinator is either because the previous
sampled elements are expired, or because the distinct elements are sampled at timestep t. We
first look into each timestep. It is possible that an distinct element is not sampled when it is
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observed, but in the later timestep. Let Xj,hi (t) be a random variable equal to 1 if the j-th
element of timestep h is sampled at timestep t by site i; Xj,hi (t) = 0, otherwise.
Pr
[
Xj,hi (t) = 1
]
=
s
|Di(t, w)|
Xhi (t) is the number of distinct elements observed at timestep h is sampled at timestep t
by site i.
E
[
Xhi (t)
]
≤
di(h)∑
j=1
Pr
[
Xj,hi (t) = 1
]
=
sdi(h)
|Di(t, w)|
, where di(h) = |Di(h, 1)|
Let Yi(t) be the number of messages sent by site i to the coordinator at timestep t. Recall
that the message transmission is because of either expired sample or new sampled element.
E [Yi(t)] ≤ E
[
Xt−wi (t− 1)
]
+ E
[
Xti (t)
]
=
sdi(t− w)
|Di(t− 1, w)| +
sdi(t)
|Di(t, w)|
Theorem 10. There is a distributed algorithm and an input stream S such that the algorithm
continuously maintains a distinct random sample of size s from S over a time-based sliding
window of size w, with k sites and T total time steps. The expected number of message trans-
missions between the sites and the coordinator is bounded by
∑k
i=1
∑T
t=1
(
sdi(t−w)
|Di(t−1,w)| +
sdi(t)
|Di(t,w)|
)
.
Proof. Consider a distributed data stream S that each site monitors its own local data stream
Si, and S = ∪ki=1Si. At each timestep, various number of distinct elements is monitored in Si.
Let Yi(T ) be the number of messages sent to the coordinator by site i with window size w
till T .
E [Yi(T )] ≤
T∑
t=1
E [Yi(t, w)]
=
T∑
t=1
(
sdi(t− w)
|Di(t− 1, w)| +
sdi(t)
|Di(t, w)|
)
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Y (T ) denotes the total number of messages the coordinator receives till T . E [Y (T )] ≤∑k
i=1
∑T
t=1
(
sdi(t−w)
|Di(t−1,w)| +
sdi(t)
|Di(t,w)|
)
.
We can further simplify our upper bound. Consider a data stream where each site monitors
the same number of distinct elements in each window. Let Di denote the number of distinct
elements in each window in site i; that is, Di = |Di(1, w)| = |Di(2, w)| = · · · = |Di(T,w)|.
Observation 3. Consider a distributed data stream where each site observes constant number
of distinct elements in each window. The total number of messages sent to the coordinator is
expected to be
E [Y (T )] ≤ 2
k∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
sdi(t)
Di
5.3.2 Lower Bound
We also prove the following lower bound on the message complexity of any algorithm for
continuous distinct sampling over a sliding window. In particular, we show that the linear
dependence of the message complexity on sT is necessary, where T is the current timestep.
Consider a data stream with constant number of distinct elements monitored at each
timestep t. With window size w, the stream maintains a constant number of distinct elements
in each window at all time. Let D be the number of distinct elements in each window.
Lemma 22. Suppose there are only one site and a coordinator. Given an input stream S, for
any distributed algorithm A, which continuously maintain a distinct sample without replacement
at the coordinator over T timesteps, the probability of a new distinct element causing the site
to send a message is at least sD .
Proof. We observe that even though a distinct element is not sampled when it arrives, it is
still possible to be sampled in the future. A message must be sent for the distinct element if
it is sample now or in the future. Consider all window that the distinct element lies in. The
probability that the element to be sampled is the maximum probability among them. For any
algorithm, the probability of a distinct element to be sampled at timestep t is max{ s|D(t,w)|} =
s
min{|D(t,w)|} =
s
D .
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Let Xj(t) be a random variable equal to 1 if the j-th distinct element at timestep t with
window size w cause the site to send message to the coordinator; otherwise, Xj(t) = 0.
Pr
[
Xj(t) = 1
] ≤ Pr [j − th element is sampled] = s
D
Theorem 11. Consider a network with one site and a coordinator. There exists an input
stream S such that for any distributed algorithm A that can continuously maintain a distinct
random sample at the coordinator over T timesteps. Let d(t) be the number of distinct elements
the site receives at time step t. The expected number of messages sent to the coordinator is at
least Ω
(∑T
t=1
sd(t)
D
)
.
Proof. Y (t) is the number of messages sent to the coordinator at time step t with window size
w. From Lemma 22, the expected number of messages sent in time step t is
E [Y (t)] =
d(t)∑
j=1
Pr
[
Xj(t, w) = 1
]
=
d(t)∑
j=1
s
D
=
sd(t)
D
Y (T ) is the number of messages sent to the coordinator till time T . By summing Y (t) from
t = 1 to T , we get
E [Y (T )] =
T∑
t=1
sd(t)
D
Recall the upper bound in Observation 3. If we consider the upper bound analysis in the
scenario with one site and a coordinator, the upper bound is O
(∑T
t=1
sd1(t)
D1
)
, which is similar
to our lower bound in Theorem 11.
5.4 Experiments
We present an experimental evaluation of our proposed algorithms. We used two datasets.
The first is an OC48 Internet Traces Dataset CAIDA OC48 Trace Project (2006), which has
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Table 5.1: The number of elements and distinct elements in OC48 IP and Enron e-mail datasets
# Elements # Distinct
OC48 42,268,510 4,337,768
Enron 1,557,491 374,330
anonymous traffic traces taken at a US west coast OC48 peering link for a large ISP in 2002 and
2003. To generate an element, we consider the concatenation of the sender’s IP address and
the receiver’s IP address. The other is the Enron Email Dataset CALO Project (2009), where
an element is constructed by concatenating the sender’s email address and the receiver’s email
address. A summary of the data is shown in Table 5.1. Each data point presented is the average
of 20 independent runs. We implemented the algorithms in Java, using the MurmurHash Holub
() hash function.
Our theoretical analysis was for the worst case, when the input data can be distributed in
an arbitrary manner by the adversary. Here we present experimental results for the infinite
windows case, including the impact of data distribution, of sample size, and a comparison with
an alternate, natural algorithm that is based on a broadcast from the coordinator to the sites.
5.4.1 Infinite Window
Impact of Data Distribution We examine the performance of our algorithm under
different distribution methods. In the first method, called “flooding”, each incoming element is
assigned to every site. In the second method, called “random”, an incoming element is sent to
a single site, chosen uniformly at random. In the third method, “round-robin”, each element
is sent to a single site, and the elements are assigned to sites in a round-robin manner, i.e.
the j-th element is monitored by site (j mod k) + 1. The results for random and round-robin
turned out to be nearly identical, so we only present the results for random distribution.
Figure 5.2 shows the communication complexity as the function of the number of elements
for 10 sites and a sample size of 5. From Figure 5.2, we observe that at the beginning, the com-
munication complexity increases quickly, since the sample is changing often. As more elements
are observed, the rate of change of the sample decreases and fewer messages are sent. It is clear
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(a) OC48 IP Dataset (b) OC48 IP Dataset
Figure 5.2: The communication complexity as a function of number of elements under two
different methods of data distribution, “flooding” and “random”, for 10 sites and a sample size
of 5.
that the communication complexity under flooding is significantly larger than the communi-
cation complexity under random, though the total number of distinct elements seen in both
inputs is the same. This scenario is explained by our tighter upper bound 2ks
(
1 +
∑k
i=1 ln
di
s
)
(see Observation 2), which shows the influence of the number of distinct elements observed at
the individual sites on the total messages sent.
Impact of Sample Size Figure 5.4 shows the communication complexity as a function of
the sample size for 50 sites. The message complexity increases almost linearly with the sample
size, though the slopes are different for different methods of data distribution. Figure 5.6 shows
the communication complexity as a function of the number of sites k for a sample size of 20. For
flooding, the communication complexity increases linearly with the number of sites. However,
for random distribution, the number of messages is much smaller than in case of flooding, and
is almost independent of the number of sites.
Comparison with Other Algorithms To our knowledge, there are no prior published
methods for distinct sampling on a distributed stream. We compare the performance of our
algorithm with another natural algorithm, which we call Algorithm “Broadcast”. The differ-
ence between Algorithm Broadcast and our proposed method is that Algorithm Broadcast will
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(a) OC48 IP Dataset (b) OC48 IP Dataset
Figure 5.4: The communication complexity as a function of the sample size s for 50 sites.
(a) OC48 IP Dataset (b) OC48 IP Dataset
Figure 5.6: The communication complexity as function of the number of sites k for a sample
size of 20.
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(a) OC48 IP Dataset (b) OC48 IP Dataset
Figure 5.8: The communication complexity by Algorithm Broadcast and our proposed method
for 10 sites and a sample size of 5.
broadcast the current value of u (which has the value of u(t) at time t) to all sites whenever
there is an update to u. This version has the advantage that fewer messages are sent from
the sites to the coordinator, since the uis are always in sync with the coordinator. However,
this has the downside of requiring a broadcast each time u changes. In Figure 5.8, we present
a comparison between the two algorithms for 10 sites and a sample size of 5. It is clear that
Broadcast requires significantly more messages than our algorithm; this suggests that typically
it is not worth keeping the different sites synchronized with respect to the value of u. Our
algorithm’s “lazy” approach of refreshing u when necessary results in fewer messages.
We also note that the message cost of Algorithm Broadcast is linear in the number of sites
k, and the sample size s. However, the slope of the Broadcast algorithm is considerably higher
than our proposed algorithm. We show the comparison of the two algorithms as a function of
the sample size in Figure 5.12. Similar results are observed with the dependence on the number
of sites.
Impact of Skew We next consider the influence of the non-uniformity in the sizes of
the streams observed at different sites. Here, we construct a distributed input which is skewed
towards a single site that “dominates” over the other sites in terms of the number of distinct
elements that it observes. Each input element is sent to only one site; but instead of dealing
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(a) OC48 IP Dataset (b) OC48 IP Dataset
Figure 5.10: The communication complexity by Algorithm Broadcast and our proposed method
on different sample size with 50 sites.
(a) OC48 IP Dataset (b) OC48 IP Dataset
Figure 5.12: The communication complexity by Algorithm Broadcast and our proposed method
on different number of sites (k) with a sample size of 20.
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(a) OC48 IP Dataset (b) OC48 IP Dataset
Figure 5.14: The communication complexity by Algorithm Broadcast and our proposed method,
as a function of the skew, for 20 sites and a sample size of 20.
it randomly or in a round-robin fashion, we send the element to site 1 with a probability that
is a factor α times the probability that a site other than 1 is chosen. We call this factor as the
“skew”. For example, if the skew is 200, then site 1 is 200 times more likely to receive an element
than another site. Figure 5.14 shows the relation between the communication complexity and
the skew for different algorithms with 20 sites and a sample size of 20. The communication
complexity reduces as the skew increases; this can be anticipated through Observation 2 that
presents an analysis in terms of the number of distinct elements observed at each site. Note
that the higher the skew, the closer this gets to centralized stream monitoring.
Comparison with Random Sampling We compare our algorithm, Distributed Dis-
tinct Sampling (DDS), with Distributed Random Sampling algorithm (DRS) Tirthapura and
Woodruff (2011). Different from DDS, which sample from the distinct set of input streams,
DRS sample randomly from the union set of input streams. We apply three different data dis-
tribution methods: flooding, round-robin, and random. With 20 distributed sites and a sample
of size 50, we repeat the experiments 20 times and take the average of the number of messages
transmitted as the evaluation metric.
Figures 5.16, 5.18, and 5.20 show the communication complexity of our algorithm and DRS
using flooding, round-robin, and random distributions. We observe that the random sampling
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(a) OC48 IP Dataset (b) OC48 IP Dataset
Figure 5.16: The communication complexity by Random Sampling algorithm Tirthapura and
Woodruff (2011) and our proposed method as a function of number of elements for 20 sites and
a sample size of 50 using flooding distribution.
(a) OC48 IP Dataset (b) OC48 IP Dataset
Figure 5.18: The communication complexity by Random Sampling algorithm Tirthapura and
Woodruff (2011) and our proposed method as a function of number of elements for 20 sites and
a sample size of 50 using Round-Robin data distribution.
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(a) OC48 IP Dataset (b) OC48 IP Dataset
Figure 5.20: The communication complexity sent by Random Sampling algorithm Tirthapura
and Woodruff (2011) and our proposed method as a function of number of elements for 20 sites
and a sample size of 50 using random data distribution.
(a) OC48 IP Dataset (b) OC48 IP Dataset
Figure 5.22: The number of messages sent by Random Sampling algorithm Tirthapura and
Woodruff (2011) and our proposed method as a function of skew for 20 sites and a sample size
of 50 using random data distribution.
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algorithm performs lower communication complexity than ours. Recall our analysis of DRS
and DDS in the previous section. The sampling probability of DDS is sd , where s is the sample
size and d is the number of distinct elements observed so far, while the sampling probability
of DRS is sn , where n is the number of elements observed. Note that n ≥ d, and the sampling
probability of DDS is larger than DRS’s. This leads to a greater communication complexity
for DDS than DRS.
We perform our experiments comparing DRS and DDS on skew. Figure 5.22 shows the
communication complexity as a function of skew with 20 sites and a sample size of 50. Both of
the algorithms decrease their communication complexity. With higher probability to send out
new elements, our algorithm performs higher message transmission. Even with high skew rate,
our algorithm has higher communication complexity than DRS.
5.4.2 Sliding Window
We derive the inputs to sliding windows from the OC48 and Enron Mail datasets as follows.
We consider timesteps numbered consecutively from 1 onwards. The memory consumption and
communication complexity are recorded at each timestep, for different numbers of sites and
window sizes. Each data point is the average of 20 independent experiments.
Communication and Memory Complexity: For these experiments, we have fixed the
sample size at 5, the number of sites at 40 and the sliding window size at 150. In each timestep,
we assign 150 elements to different sites chosen randomly; hence, it is possible that multiple
elements are observed by the same site in the same timestep. Figure 5.24 shows the average
memory consumption per site as a function of the timesteps. Figure 5.26 shows the total
communication complexity as a function of the timesteps. From Figure 5.24, we note that the
per site memory consumption is bounded within a region and exceeds the region with a low
probability. Observing from Figure 5.26, the communication complexity has linear dependency
on timestep. As the window moves, the communication complexity increase linearly.
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(a) OC48 IP Dataset (b) OC48 IP Dataset
Figure 5.24: Sliding Windows: Memory consumption in each site versus time steps for 40 sites,
a sample size of 5, and a sliding window of 150
(a) OC48 IP Dataset (b) OC48 IP Dataset
Figure 5.26: Sliding Windows: Communication complexity versus time steps for 40 sites, a
sample size of 5, and a sliding window of 150
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(a) OC48 IP Dataset (b) OC48 IP Dataset
Figure 5.28: Sliding Windows: Communication complexity as a function of number of sites for
a sample size of 10 and a window size of 100
Impact of Number of Sites Figure 5.28 shows the number of messages transmitted
when the number of sites k is varying. In each timestep, we assign 10 elements to different sites
chosen randomly. The window size is fixed at 100, and the sample size is fixed at 10. Note
that as the number of sites is increased, fewer elements arrive at each site, leading to a lesser
memory consumption per site.
Impact of Window Size Figure 5.30 shows the communication complexity as a function
of window size. The number of sites is fixed at 40 and the sample size is fixed at 10. In each
timestep, we assign 10 elements to different sites chosen randomly. We observe that the commu-
nication complexity decreases as the window size increases. Recall the upper bound of our algo-
rithm, Theorem 10, where the communication complexity is bounded by O
(
s
∑T
t=w
s
|Di(t,w)|
)
.
When the window size increases, we have larger number of distinct elements in the window,
i.e., |Di(t, w)| increases. It leads to a lower communication complexity.
Impact of Sample Size Figure 5.32 shows the communication complexity as a function
of sample size. The number of sites is fixed at 40 and the window size is fixed at 100. In
each timestep, we assign 10 elements to different sites chosen randomly. We observe that as
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(a) OC48 IP Dataset (b) OC48 IP Dataset
Figure 5.30: Sliding Windows: Communication complexity as a function of window size for 40
sites and a sample size of 10
the sample size increases, the communication complexity increases as well. There is linear
dependency on the sample size, which is consistent with our analysis.
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(a) OC48 IP Dataset (b) OC48 IP Dataset
Figure 5.32: Sliding Windows: Communication complexity as a function of number of sites for
40 sites and a window size of 100
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PART II
INSIDER THREAT DETECTION
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CHAPTER 6. INSIDER THREAT DETECTION OVER LOG STREAMS
6.1 Overview
As we discussed in Section 1.2, the damage caused by malicious insiders is enormous, but the
detection of insider threat is hard. Because of the privacy issues, there are a few insider threat
datasets. In this project, we need to build up a framework that 1) can detect the malicious
insider in a streaming fashion, and 2) can be generally used in different working environments
or organizations.
6.2 Detection Approach
Given the set of system logs, we design have two approaches toward detecting anomaly
user events. We propose a Session-based Anomaly Detection and Scenario-based Anomaly
Detection.
6.2.1 Session-based Anomaly Detection
Our first approach is attempting to model the overall user behavior, and report anomaly if a
user doesn’t follow his/her previous behavior pattern. Supposed Eric always comes to work at
7am, views emails and websites, and logs off at 4pm. We records his history behavior patterns
in a model. One day Eric logged on to other’s PC at 11pm, copied a file to a usb stick, and
logged off at 1pm. Comparing to his history behavior patterns, we can report anomaly for
these events. The architecture of Session-based Anomaly Detection and the implementation
detail are described in Section 6.3.
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6.2.2 Scenario-based Anomaly Detection
Observing from the data, we find out that each behavior itself is not anomaly; however,
when we read from the context, an anomaly is detected. We move our approach to an micro-
detection upon user behaviors and lead to an macro-malicious detection.
Malicious insiders follow a attack scenario. Attack scenarios describe the behavior sequences
performed by malicious insiders to achieve their goal. The goal of malicious insiders are financial
needs or to damage the company’s reputation. To achieve their goal, they take approaches like
using removable devices, uploading to websites, sending out files in emails, sending out emails
and causing panic to colleagues. These types of behaviors are the possible types of anomaly
behaviors. Each type of anomaly behavior is modeled by a probability model, and labeled by
an unique character. The behavior sequence of an user is evaluated by the behavior models.
The sequence of anomaly behavior is transformed into a string, Lu. For example, Eric logged
on to his home pc at 7pm, surfed several websites, and sent emails. At 9pm, he logged on
another pc, and copy a file to his usb stick. Tabel 6.1 shows the mapping of events and label.
Table 6.1: An example of a table mapping anomaly events with labels
Event Label
Logon at Odd Hour a
Logon to other’s PC b
Surf Career Websites c
Send a Mass Email d
Copy Files to Removable Device e
The events of Eric can be transformed into Lu = “abe . . .′′. We can also transform the behavior
sequence in each attack scenario into a normal expression, Si. In the above example of Eric,
supposed there is a scenario, describing a user logging into other’s pc and stealing data, the
general expression for the scenario, Si = “b[\w]∗e′′. For there is a match of Lu and Si, we send
an alert of anomaly. The detail of scenario-based anomaly detection is described in Section 6.4.
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Figure 6.1: The architecture of the unsupervised insider threat detection
6.3 Session-based Anomaly Detection
6.3.1 Architecture of Unsupervised Insider Threat Detection
Figure 6.1 shows the architecture of our unsupervised insider threat detection.
6.3.1.1 Event Consolidator
The Event Consolidator absorbs several log streams, sorts them according to their chrono-
logical order, and outputs the composite event stream to the next stage.
6.3.1.2 Event Partitioner
The Event Partitioner takes the composite event stream and divides them into separate
streams according to a certain criteria, e.g. user id, role or department.
6.3.1.3 Streaming Segmentation
The Streaming Segmentation absorbs the log stream of a user, and cut it into logical seg-
ments. Session is a feature array recording behaviors preformed by an user in a day. The session
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starts when a user logs in, or when the user performs his/her first action (a session without log
in); ends when the user logs out, or at the end of a day (12 AM). We don’t consider time out
for each session, but we conclude a session at the end of a day, and generate another session on
the next day. Note that if the previous session wasn’t ended because of user log off, the session
generated for the next day will inherit features from the previous session, starting at 12AM.
For example, a user logs in on 3/6 at 6:30AM, and logs out on 3/8 6:10PM. Three sessions are
generated for the user: 3/6 6:30AM-12AM, 3/7 12AM-12AM, and 3/8 12AM-6:10PM.
The session feature vector is then extracted from the events in a session. In this experiment,
we choose the frequency of each event as the feature of the session, and linear normalization is
applied to the feature vector.
6.3.1.4 Unsupervised Anomaly Detection
In this experiment, we take the k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) as the unsupervised learning
method. We take the average distance of the k nearest neighbor of a new session as the
anomaly score. If the anomaly score is greater than a threshold, the new session is reported as
anomaly. In our experiment, we take 1.5 as the threshold.
kNN Anomaly Detection FS(si, sj) is a similarity metric measuring the similarity
between any two elements, si and sj , where si, sj ∈ Rd and d is the dimension. Suppose
that we have observed η elements, D = {s1, s2, · · · , sη} and we monitor a new element s′. Let
di be the similarity measurement between si and s
′, di = FS(si, s′). Let NNν(s′,D) be the
ν nearest neighbor of s′ in D; namely, the ν elements in D with the most similar to s′. The
NNν(s
′,D) can be expressed as follow:
|NNν(s′,D)| = ν
NNν(s
′,D) = {s∗ ∈ Rd|FS(s∗, s′) < FS(s, s′), ∀s ∈ D}
The kNN(s′,D) is the average distance of the k nearest neighbors of s′ in D.
kNN(s′,D) =
∑
s∈NNν(s′,D) FS(s, s
′)
k
.
We take the kNN(s′,D) to be the anomaly score of session s′.
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6.4 Scenario-based Anomaly Detection
Figure 6.2: The diagram of Scenario-based Anomaly Detection Framework.
6.4.1 System Architecture
To detect the anomaly event sequence from the system logs, we propose our framework to
standardize the log, to filter events, and to match with possible attack scenarios. Figure 6.2
presents our proposed architecture.
6.4.1.1 Log Consolidation
Log files are important data source in our system. Monitoring the data from different data
sources, the system administrators can have a better picture about the states of the system.
Furthermore, logs come from different sources with different format. We need to clean up the
data, maintain each log into a coordinate format.
After the logs are cleaned up, we categorize the logs according to the user id. All events
by the same user is in the same log file. We build up a insider detector for each user. In each
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(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Maliciious Insider
Figure 6.4: These histograms show the logon hour for selected users in r2
detector, each type of event of a user is modeled using a probability model. We can use the
detector to detect anomaly from the events.
6.4.1.2 Anomaly User Behaviors
Note that, when we detect anomaly from the events, there are some non-deterministic
events: log-on after hours, use other’s pc, send massive mail causing panic, etc. To filter
anomaly events for our detection, we need a deterministic definition for each type of anomalies.
We discuss our ways to model users’ behaviors.
User’s Home PC In organizations or companies, the IT knows who has permission to
access the PC, but it is not visible in the CERT dataset. Our assumption is that the events on
the normal PC where an user logs on must be more than half of its overall events. Based on
that, we apply a streaming algorithm on discovering the normal PC for each user on the fly.
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(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.6: These histograms show the logon hour for selected users in r3.1
(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.8: These histograms show the logon hour for selected users in r3.2
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(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.10: These histograms show the logon hour for selected users in r4.1
(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.12: These histograms show the logon hour for selected users in r4.2
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(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.14: These histograms show the logon hour for selected users in r5.1
(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.16: These histograms show the logon hour for selected users in r5.2
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(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.18: These histograms show the logon hour for selected users in r6.1
(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.20: These histograms show the logon hour for selected users in r6.2
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(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
Figure 6.22: These histograms show the number of email recipients for selected users in r2
Logon at Odd Time We first look into the log-on time by each user. Considering H0 : User logon at normal time rangeH1 : User logon uniformly random in a day
Let u be the user, and L is the log-on time. We want to know the Pr [H0|L = h]. We can
derive the probability of Pr [H0, u|L = h] as follow:
Pr [H0|L = h, u] = Pr [L = h|H0, u] ∗ Pr [H0|u]
Pr [L = h|H0, u] ∗ Pr [H0, u] + Pr [L = h|H1, u] ∗ Pr [H1|u] (6.1)
Figure 6.4 to 6.20 shows different types of log-on hour histogram in CERT dataset. For
most of the employees, the log-on hours are in a small range, while some users has diverse
log-on hours. The figures, labeled “Malicious Insider”, show the log-on hour histogram of
one of the malicious insiders. We discover most of his log-on hours are normal, but few out-
liers. The outliers are reported as “anomaly logon hour”. We model the log-on hour distri-
bution using Gaussian Distribution, Pr [L = h|H0, u] ∼ Gaussian(µ, σ2), and model H1 to be
Pr [L = h|H1, u] ∼ Uniform(0, 1440).
Supposed that Pr [H1|u] = α, where α  1, and Pr [H0|u] = (1 − α), we can estimate
Pr [H0|L = h, u] with Equation ??.
Abnormal Number of Email Recipients Consider two possible hypothesis, H0 : User sends out email with normal number of recipientsH1 : User sends out email with uniformly random number of recipients
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Figure 6.23: These histograms show the number of email recipients for selected users in r3.1
Figure 6.24: These histograms show the number of email recipients for selected users in r3.2
(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.26: These histograms show the number of email recipients for selected users in r4.1
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(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.28: These histograms show the number of email recipients for selected users in r4.2
(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.30: These histograms show the number of email recipients for selected users in r5.1
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(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Normal User
Figure 6.32: These histograms show the number of email recipients for selected users in r5.2
(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.34: These histograms show the number of email recipients for selected users in r6.1
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(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.36: These histograms show the number of email recipients for selected users in r6.2
Let R be the number of email recipients for an email. We can derive
Pr [H0|R = r, u] = Pr [R = r|H0, u] ∗ Pr [H0|u]
Pr [R = r|H0, u] ∗ Pr [H0, u] + Pr [R = r|H1, u] ∗ Pr [H1|u]
. Figure 6.22 to 6.36 show the histogram of the number of email recipients for each user in
CERT dataset. We discover that the distribution of the number of email recipients can be
modeled as Gamma Distribution.
Pr [R = r|H1] ∼ Gamma(k, θ)
. We can estimate the k and θ from µ and var, where θ = var/µ and k = mu/θ. The green line
in Figure ?? shows the probability estimation of the email recipients histogram. The figures
labeled “Malicious Insider” show the supervisors, whose email accounts are used by malicious
insiders. Comparing to normal behaviors, emails with large amount of email recipients are not
common for the two supervisors.
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(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.38: These histograms show different patterns of removable device usage for selected
users in r2
According to Gmail Help 1, for a POP or IMAP clients, an email can only contain 100
recipients. We derive
Pr [R = r|H0] ∼ Uniform(1, 100)
.
Abnormal Frequency of using Removable Device Consider two possible hypothesis, H0 : User uses removable device with normal frquencyH1 : User uses removable device uniformly random in a day
Let D be the frequency of using removable device so far in a day. We can derive
Pr [H0|D = d, u] = Pr [D = d|H0, u] ∗ Pr [H0|u]
Pr [D = d|H0, u] ∗ Pr [H0, u] + Pr [D = d|H1, u] ∗ Pr [H1|u]
. Figure 6.38 to 6.54 show the histogram of the frequency of removable device usage for each
user in CERT dataset. We discover that the distribution of the frequency can be modeled as
Gamma Distribution.
Pr [D = d|H1, u] ∼ Gamma(k, θ)
1https://support.google.com/mail/answer/22839?hl=en
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(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.40: These histograms show different patterns of removable device usage for selected
users in r3.1
(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.42: These histograms show different patterns of removable device usage for selected
users in r3.2
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(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.44: These histograms show different patterns of removable device usage for selected
users in r4.1
(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.46: These histograms show different patterns of removable device usage for selected
users in r4.2
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(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.48: These histograms show different patterns of removable device usage for selected
users in r5.1
(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.50: These histograms show different patterns of removable device usage for selected
users in r5.2
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(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.52: These histograms show different patterns of removable device usage for selected
users in r6.1
(a) Normal User (b) Normal User
(c) Normal User (d) Malicious Insider
Figure 6.54: These histograms show different patterns of removable device usage for selected
users in r6.2
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. We can estimate the k and θ from µ and var, where θ = var/µ and k = mu/θ. Figure (d) is
the malicious insider, and the others are normal users. Comparing with normal users, CSF2712
doesn’t use removable device, but having frequent usage in several days. Pr [D = d|H1, u] can
also be modeled as uniform distribution, Pr [D = d|H1, u] ∼ Uniform(0,D), where D is the
maximum frequency of using removable device (D = 20 in the experiment.)
User Surfing Career Websites The reason why we need to know whether users surf
career websites is, by understanding this, we can know users are looking for jobs. If the user
then sending email out of the company or using removable device, we can alert that the user
may compromising with someone or stealing data from the company. However, it’s hard to
distinguish career website from url only. For example, viewing Linkedin.com doesn’t lead
to viewing positions, the user can just reading posts in the website. Even more, in current
design, the urls contain a series of random characters. To understand the website, we need to
understand its content.
Give Ξ = {ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξn} is a set of url documents, and W = {w1, w2, . . . } is a set of words.
ui is a bag of words, containing words in W . Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency
(TF-IDF) is a numerical statistic showing the importance of a word to a document in the corpus.
TF-IDF is applied to U and come up with a feature vector for each url, TF − IDF (UL) =
{TF − IDF (ξ1), TF − IDF (ξ2), . . . , TF − IDF (ξn)}. A Support Vector Machine (SVM) ?) is
then applied to TF − IDF (Ξ).
6.4.1.3 Implementation of Scenario-based Anomaly Detector
The procedure for FSM design is simple. For example, one of the attack scenario is described
as follow:
User who did not previously use removable drives or work after
hours begins logging in after hours, using a removable drive, and
uploading data to wikileaks.org. Leaves the organization shortly
thereafter.
The anomaly activities is marked as red. The following is the result:
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User who did not previously use removable drives or work after
hours begins logging in after hours, using a removable drive, and
uploading data to wikileaks.org. Leaves the organization shortly
thereafter.
The actions related to the scenario is “work after hours begins logging in after hours”,
“using a removable drive”, and “uploading data to wikileaks.org.” We then can decide the
sequence of the events, and design the states and state transitions for the scenario. Figure 6.55
shows the result FSM for the attack scenario.
Figure 6.55: The diagram of FSM for scenario 1.
6.4.2 Analysis
Lemma 23. For career website classifier, our algorithm requires O (|W |) memory space.
Proof. Let W = {w1, w2, . . . } be a set of words in the training set. For TF-IDF calculationg,
our algorithm needs to maintain the words and their document frequency information. For
linear SVM classification, our algorithm requires |W |+ 1 weight values. Therefore, it requires
O (|W |) memory space.
Furthermore, the memory consumption can be further reduced if we apply `1 regularization.
SVM with `1 regularization is commonly used in feature selection. Our system can only main-
tain the information about the selected words and their weights. The memory consumption
can be further reduced, O
(
|W˜ |
)
, where W˜ is the set of selected words, and |W˜ |  |W |.
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Lemma 24. Given a data stream containing system logs by all the users in an organization,
we assume the data stream following chronological order. Our algorithm requires O (|S|) space
for each user. Upon receiving new log, the time complexity is O (|S|), where Su = {s1, s2, . . . }
be the set of all the states and |S| is the size of the set.
Proof. In our algorithm, for each user, we maintain all the possible states the user may be in.
This requires O (|S|) memory space for each user. Upon receiving a new log, our algorithm
requires to go through all the stored states. We apply Hash Map for storing state transitions,
which requires O(1) for mapping one activity to the next state. Overall, the time complexity
is O (|S|) for each log.
Theorem 12. Given a data stream containing system logs by all the users in an organization,
we have observe η logs so far. Our algorithm requires O (η|S|) time to proceed the data. The
space complexity is O (|S|+ |W |).
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6.5 Experimental Evaluation
6.5.1 The CERT Dataset
In this project, we are given a set of synthetic dataset, the The CERT Division and Ex-
actData LLC () dataset. The CERT dataset is published by CERT Division, partner with
ExactData LLC, and sponsored by DARPA I2O. This dataset contains both background log
data and logs from synthetic malicious users. Ten different examples are generated, labeled
as r1, r2, r3.1, etc. We take all the examples from the CERT dataset, but r1. No malicious
insider is in r1 dataset. The log files record the logon, logoff, device accesses, http views, email
accesses, and file accesses. In each example, an LDAP information and five logs files (e.g.
logon, device, http, email, and file) are recorded. Table 6.2 shows the statistics of files in each
example. The CERT dataset records the computer access events from Jan., 2010 to May, 2011.
6.5.2 Attack Scenarios
Malicious insiders in the CERT dataset follow five attack scenarios. The description of the
scenarios are described as in Table 6.3.
Table 6.4 shows the number of employees and malicious insiders under each attack scenario.
Each example has different number of malicious insiders and attack scenarios.
Based on the description of the scenarios, we then design the FSM diagrams for each
scenario. Figure 6.57 shows the diagrams of scenarios.
6.5.3 Evaluation Metrics
In the experiment, we compare our performance on three different methods: insider threat
detection using session feature vectors (Session), FSM with pre-defined transitions (FSM-PD),
and FSM with pre-defined learned transition (FSM-ML). We evaluate our performance by
precision and recall rate, along with the number of undetected insiders.
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Table 6.2: The statistics of log files in each example
r2 Number of logs r3.1 Number of logs r3.2 Number of logs
Total Employees 1,000 Total Employees 1,000 Total Employees 1,000
Logon 840,141 Logon 842,109 Logon 845,351
Device 712,308 Device 417,587 Device 407,908
Http 7,921,105 Http 23,555,143 Http 23,845,079
Email 425,750,957 Email 1,994,071 Email 1,975,101
File 0 File 457,520 File 434,769
Total 435,224,511 Total 27,266,430 Total 27,508,208
r4.1 Number of logs r4.2 Number of logs r5.1 Number of logs
Total Employees 1,000 Total Employees 1,000 Total Employees 2,000
Logon 899,118 Logon 854,859 Logon 1,829,996
Device 437,168 Device 405,380 Device 908,379
Http 29,553,383 Http 28,434,423 Http 59,686,023
Email 2,733,360 Email 2,629,979 Email 17,608,751
File 414,556 File 495,581 File 947,613
Total 34,037,585 Total 32,770,222 Total 80,980,762
r5.2 Number of logs r6.1 Number of logs r6.2 Number of logs
Total Employees 2,000 Total Employees 4,000 Total Employees 4,000
Logon 1,810,070 Logon 3,533,792 Logon 3,530,285
Device 836,984 Device 1,736,797 Device 1,551,828
Http 58,960,449 Http 117,185,988 Http 117,025,216
Email 17,361,575 Email 11,009,192 Email 10,994,957
File 887,621 File 2,088,965 File 2,014,883
Total 79,856,699 Total 135,554,734 Total 135,117,169
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Table 6.3: Table of Different Attack Scenarios in CERT
Type of Scenario Description of Scenario
Scenario 1
User who did not previously use removable drives or work after
hours begins logging in after hours, using a removable drive, and
uploading data to wikileaks.org. Leaves the organization shortly
thereafter.
Scenario 2
User begins surfing job websites and soliciting employment from
a competitor. Before leaving the company, they use a thumb
drive (at markedly higher rates than their previous activity) to
steal data.
Scenario 3
System administrator becomes disgruntled. Downloads a
keylogger and uses a thumb drive to transfer it to his supervisor’s
machine. The next day, he uses the collected keylogs to log in as
his supervisor and send out an alarming mass email, causing
panic in the organization. He leaves the organization immediately.
Scenario 4
A user logs into another user’s machine and searches for
interesting files, emailing to their home email. This behavior
occurs more and more frequently over a 3 month period.
Scenario 5
A member of a group decimated by layoffs uploads documents to
Dropbox, planning to use them for personal gain.
Number of Patterns This evaluation metric evaluates the number of instances/patterns
we report to the administrator. For Session, we count the number of sessions we report. For
the other, we count the number of reported event sequences.
Precision and Recall Precision and recall are two of the popular evaluation metrics to
evaluate the detection quality. Precision is the number of true malicious events we report over
the number of reported events. It reflects how precise our report result is. Recall is the number
of true malicious events we report over the number of known malicious events. It reflects how
precise the malicious events are detected. The formula of both evaluation metric is as follow:
Precision =
|retrieved malicious events|
|retrieved evnets|
Recall =
|retrieved malicious events|
|malicious evnets|
Number of Undetected Insiders We are also interested in how good we can detect
the anomaly users. This evaluation metric compares the anomaly users we detect and the
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Table 6.4: The malicious insiders and their attack scenario in each example.
r2 # Insiders r3.1 # Insiders r3.2 # Insiders
Scenario 1 1 Scenario 1 1 Scenario 1 1
Scenario 2 0 Scenario 2 1 Scenario 2 1
Scenario 3 0 Scenario 3 0 Scenario 3 0
Scenario 4 0 Scenario 4 0 Scenario 4 0
Scenario 5 0 Scenario 5 0 Scenario 5 0
r4.1 # Insiders r4.2 # Insiders r5.1 # Insiders
Scenario 1 1 Scenario 1 30 Scenario 1 1
Scenario 2 1 Scenario 2 30 Scenario 2 1
Scenario 3 2 Scenario 3 12 Scenario 3 13
Scenario 4 0 Scenario 4 0 Scenario 4 1
Scenario 5 0 Scenario 5 0 Scenario 5 0
r5.2 # Insiders r6.1 # Insiders r6.2 # Insiders
Scenario 1 29 Scenario 1 1 Scenario 1 1
Scenario 2 30 Scenario 2 1 Scenario 2 1
Scenario 3 10 Scenario 3 6 Scenario 3 25
Scenario 4 30 Scenario 4 0 Scenario 4 1
Scenario 5 0 Scenario 5 4 Scenario 5 1
malicious users in the answer file. The number of malicious users missed in our detection is
used to evaluate the quality of the detection.
6.5.4 Experiment Results
r2
Figure 6.60 shows the experiment result for r2 dataset. We can first see from Figure 6.59a
that our propose method, FSM-ML, reports the lease patterns from the dataset, and also yields
the best precision among the three methods (Figure 6.59b). The recall rate of FSM-ML is 15%
less than Session. For session reports all events in an anomaly session, it covers all the malicious
events in the anomaly session. FSM-ML focuses on reporting a sequence of anomaly events.
Therefore, FSM-ML has better precision, but less recall on the dataset.
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r3.1
Observing from Figure 6.62, we can see that the precision of FSM-PD is better than Session
on r3.1 (Figure 6.61b). The recall rate of Session is better than the other.
r3.2
Figure 6.64 shows the experiment result of r3.2. In Figure 6.63c, we find out that FSM-PD
has the best recall rate. It is because that the transition of FSM-ML uses anomaly usage of
removable device, while FSM-PD uses removable device usage. For some cases, the malicious
usage of removable device is less anomaly for FSM-ML, but it is detected by FSM-PD. All the
three methods report all the malicious insiders.
r4.1
Figure 6.66 shows the experiment result of r4.1. Comparing to r3.2, the result of r4.1 is
similar to each other. FSM-ML reports the least patterns, yield the best precision, and reports
all the malicious users. FSM-PD yields the best recall rate, around 4% better than FSM-ML.
r4.2
Figure 6.68 shows the experiment result of r4.2. One interesting observation in r4.2 is that
Session and FSM-PD miss malicious insiders. Our proposed method, FSM-ML dominates all
evaluation metrics among all three methods.
r5.1
Figure 6.70 shows the experiment result of r5.1. Session has the best recall rate, but the
least precision and misses the most malicious insiders. As Session reports a big set of user logs,
a single anomaly session may cover lots of malicious event. It fails to cover all kinds of attack
scenarios, which leads to miss many malicious users.
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r5.2
Figure 6.72 shows the experiment result of r5.2. The result of r5.2 is similar to r5.1. The
difference is that only Session misses malicious users. Our proposed method, FSM-ML, has the
least number of patterns reported, the best precision, and no non-detected malicious insiders.
r6.1
Figure 6.74 shows the experiment result of r6.1. FSM-PD and FSM-ML report the most
patterns from the dataset, but they moth have the best precision and recall rate. They also
miss the least malicious insider.
r6.2
Figure 6.76 shows the experiment result of r6.2. Three methods report similar number of
patterns. FSM-PD and FSM-ML have the best precision and recall rate. Session misses the
most malicious insiders.
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(a) Scenario 1: User who did not previously use
removable drives or work after hours begins log-
ging in after hours, using a removable drive, and
uploading data to wikileaks.org. Leaves the or-
ganization shortly thereafter.
(b) Scenario 2: User begins surfing job websites
and soliciting employment from a competitor.
Before leaving the company, they use a thumb
drive (at markedly higher rates than their previ-
ous activity) to steal data.
(c) Scenario 3: System administrator becomes
disgruntled. Downloads a keylogger and uses a
thumb drive to transfer it to his supervisor’s ma-
chine. The next day, he uses the collected keylogs
to log in as his supervisor and send out an alarm-
ing mass email, causing panic in the organization.
He leaves the organization immediately.
(d) Scenario 4: A user logs into another user’s
machine and searches for interesting files, email-
ing to their home email. This behavior occurs
more and more frequently over a 3 month period.
(e) Scenario 5: A member of a group decimated
by layoffs uploads documents to Dropbox, plan-
ning to use them for personal gain.
Figure 6.57: FSM diagrams for attack scenarios in the CERT dataset.
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Figure 6.58: The diagram of the combination of all the FSM.
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Figure 6.60: Evaluation metrics for r2 in CERT datasets
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Figure 6.62: Evaluation metrics for r3.1 in CERT datasets
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Figure 6.64: Evaluation metrics for r3.2 in CERT datasets
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Figure 6.66: Evaluation metrics for r4.1 in CERT datasets
110
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
r4.2
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
P
a
tt
er
n
s
Comparison of Number of Detected Patterns
Session
FSM-PD
FSM-ML
(a) Number of Detected Patterns
0.1
1
10
r4.2
P
re
ci
si
o
n
(%
)
Precision
Session
FSM-PD
FSM-ML
(b) Precision
10
100
r4.2
R
ec
a
ll
(%
)
Recall
Session
FSM-PD
FSM-ML
(c) Recall
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
r4.2N
u
m
b
er
o
f
U
n
d
et
ec
te
d
In
si
d
er
s Undetected Insiders
Session
FSM-PD
FSM-ML
(d) Number of Undetected Insiders
Figure 6.68: Evaluation metrics for r4.2 in CERT datasets
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Figure 6.70: Evaluation metrics for r5.1 in CERT datasets
112
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
r5.2
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
P
a
tt
er
n
s
Comparison of Number of Detected Patterns
Session
FSM-PD
FSM-ML
(a) Number of Detected Patterns
0.1
1
r5.2
P
re
ci
si
o
n
(%
)
Precision
Session
FSM-PD
FSM-ML
(b) Precision
10
100
r5.2
R
ec
a
ll
(%
)
Recall
Session
FSM-PD
FSM-ML
(c) Recall
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
r5.2N
u
m
b
er
o
f
U
n
d
et
ec
te
d
In
si
d
er
s Undetected Insiders
Session
FSM-PD
FSM-ML
(d) Number of Undetected Insiders
Figure 6.72: Evaluation metrics for r5.2 in CERT datasets
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Figure 6.74: Evaluation metrics for r6.1 in CERT datasets
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Figure 6.76: Evaluation metrics for r6.2 in CERT datasets
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CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this report, I have devoted into two major projects: 1) Sampling methods on distributed
data stream, and 2) Network security application. In my first project, I design and analyze a
fundamental distributed algorithm, random sampling and distributed random sampling. Sev-
eral variations of the algorithms are also concerned: sampling with and without replacement,
sliding window, and the case of skew. We also prove the optimal of our algorithms. We im-
plement our algorithms and perform experiments on real world datasets. The performance is
compared with other algorithms.
In the application on network security, we propose two approached toward insider threat
detection: Session-based Anomaly Detection and Scenario-based Anomaly detection. The
Session-based Anomaly Detection provides a macro-view of a user’s behavior pattern, and
report anomaly when user disobey his/her history behavior patterns. The scenario-based
Anomaly Detection provides a micro-observance on anomaly user activities, and lead to a
macro-observance of anomaly behavior sequence. We also compare the performance among
Session, FSM-PD, and FSM-ML on a set of synthetic system logs. FSM-ML has the best
performance among three methods on the CERT dataset.
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